Saturday, October 30, 2021

Preventing, Detecting and Punishing Chess Cheating in the Digital Age

Note: I wrote this paper while taking the "Social Media and the Law" class at the University of Dayton School of Law during the summer of 2015. This paper has never been published, but the issues raised in this paper are, if anything, even more relevant today than they were in 2015, so I decided to post the complete paper here exactly as I originally wrote it. 

INTRODUCTION: THE GAME OF KINGS, PLAYED BY KINGS

Chess cheating has become a major issue in the past decade or so due to a combination of three factors: increased chess computing power, miniaturization of chess computing devices/cell phones, and increased prizes at chess tournaments. Chess cheaters now have the means to easily conceal devices that can give them a huge, unfair competitive advantage, and they have the financial motive to use those devices.1 This paper will examine how chess computers and social media are employed by chess cheaters, and the legal remedies that can be employed to prevent, detect and punish chess cheaters.

First, though, it is important to take a brief look at how the game of chess has evolved and how chess tournaments function. This will make it easier to understand the challenges associated with preventing, detecting, and punishing chess cheaters.

Historian Richard Eales notes that chess was most likely invented in northern India in the sixth century CE.2 The first European references to chess predate 1000 CE.3 After chess reached Europe, the game evolved as a result of a series of rules changes primarily designed to “speed up the game.”4 By 1550, the new, modernized form of chess prevailed throughout most of Europe.5

Chess is a difficult game to master but it is an easy game to learn. The basic instructions about how to play, summarized in this paragraph and the following paragraph, can be grasped quickly by even a very young child and take up fewer than five pages in the U.S. Chess Federation (USCF) rule book.6 Chess is played on a 64 square board of alternating light and dark squares, with the board positioned so that a light colored square is always placed by each player’s right hand (a distinction that is often disregarded in mainstream media depictions of a chess board). The goal is to checkmate the opposing King, which means placing that King under an attack from which the King cannot escape. The King is the most important piece but also the most vulnerable. The Queen is the most powerful piece, as she can move any number of unoccupied squares up, down, to the right, to the left or on a diagonal (but only in one direction on a given turn). The Rook moves like the Queen except that it cannot operate on diagonals. A Bishop operates only on diagonals that are the same color as its original home square.

The quirky Knight is the only piece that moves in two directions on a single turn and the only piece that can hop over another piece in its path; its move encompasses an “L”-shape, covering two squares vertically and one square horizontally or two squares horizontally and one square vertically. The lowly Pawn marches straight ahead one square at a time, except on its very first move of the game when it has an option of marching forward one square or two squares. However, the Pawn is the only unit that captures differently than it normally moves; it cannot capture an enemy unit in its normal path but it can capture an enemy unit one diagonal in front to the right or left. A Pawn that moves two squares on its first move to pass an enemy pawn and avoid being captured can be captured “en passant” (in passing) by that enemy pawn but only if the opposing player avails himself of that option on his very next move. A Pawn that reaches the eighth rank can and must be promoted to any piece except a King.

In Europe, this game of battling kings was often played by kings and members of the aristocracy.7 King Philip II of Spain and King Sebastian of Portugal are just two of the many medieval rulers who played and sponsored chess.8 “The tradition of the itinerant chessmaster, touring with his chessmen from court to court like some medieval minstrel, continued well into the seventeenth century,” explains author and International Master William Hartston.9

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TOURNAMENT CHESS

Chess was originally played without any kind of timing device or clock. In a game without a clock, the player with the losing position could stall.10 An 1843 game between Howard Staunton and Pierre St. Amant lasted over 14 hours. According to chess historian Bill Wall, “These kinds of purposeless prolongations and deliberate attempts to fatigue and wear out the opponent were commonplace at the time, and an average game lasted nine hours.”11 The development and use of the chess clock in the mid-1800s made it feasible to hold international tournaments pitting the strongest players in the world against each other.

Sometimes it was necessary to “adjourn” a timed game. When this happened, the player on move wrote down his intended move, stopped his clock and “sealed” his written move in an envelope that the tournament director kept until the game could be resumed. When the game was resumed, the tournament director opened the envelope in the presence of both players and the sealing player was required to play the move that he had written down. In theory, the players were not allowed to analyze the paused game prior to resumption but in practice this restriction was difficult to enforce and it became standard practice for each player to analyze the game with other players.12 The success of the former Soviet Union’s chess players in international competition stemmed in part from their teamwork in such situations.13

Since a tournament chess player is not allowed to consult with other parties or with any written material during a game, the adjournment process seems like it permits or even encourages players to violate the rules. USCF Life Master Mike Petersen describes why this was acceptable in a bygone era even in FIDE (an acronym for Federation Internationale des Echecs, which means World Chess Federation) events:

The net effect was that the player who sealed the move knew his next move, but not what his opponent will play against it. The player who did not seal the move has to wait until the next day to find out his opponent’s next move.  Both players were therefore in the same situation. It was a fair as you could get.  There was only one problem. How did they prevent someone from analyzing the game during the adjournment period?  Well, they didn’t.  All Grandmasters at FIDE tournaments had at least one other ranked player with them whose job it was to analyze the adjourned positions and go over them with the player.  But that’s cheating, you might say.  Yes, today it would be considered that, but not back then.  There were no reliable chess engines to analyze the game to death, so a GM’s “second” was a very valuable commodity.  Today we look upon this practice as weird, but it was necessary back then.14

As Petersen indicated, the development of powerful chess computers made it necessary for all tournament games to end in one playing session without adjournment, because otherwise the players could enter the adjourned position into a computer and possibly obtain a definitive answer about how to proceed.

THE SILICON MONSTER CHANGES THE GAME

In retrospect, the creation of computers that play chess at a Grandmaster level may seem inevitable but as recently as 40 years ago many experts in the field thought that chess is so complex that no computer could ever be programmed to beat the best human chess players. The number of possible legal chess positions is 1040 and the number of possible chess games is 10120, which is 10 followed by 120 zeroes.15 Such numbers are literally astronomical: the number of possible chess games exceeds the number of atoms in the universe.16

In 1968, reigning Scottish chess champion David Levy bet 500 British pounds (half of his annual income at the time) that no chess computer would be able to beat him in a match by August 1978.17  By 1971, Levy had become an International Master (the highest title in chess other than Grandmaster), the best chess computers had hardly improved at all and Levy increased his wager to 1250 British pounds.18 Until 1977, no computer program was strong enough to even mount a worthy challenge to Levy but that year Levy faced two different programs and won matches against both of them without suffering a single draw or loss.19 In 1978, Levy defeated a third computer before facing his fourth and final challenge, a six game match against a program called CHESS 4.720 CHESS 4.7 held Levy to a draw in the first game, marking the first time that a computer drew with an International Master under tournament conditions. Levy won the next two games and, needing only a draw win the bet, he decided to have some fun with an experimental opening. CHESS 4.7 won that game and then Levy returned to a safe and solid strategy, winning game five and his bet.21 Levy then made another bet, this time for $1000, that no computer would beat him by the end of 1983, and the editors of Omni magazine put up an additional $4000 on Levy’s behalf.22 Levy won that bet as well and he then renewed that bet, eventually losing in 1989.23

By that time, computers could beat Grandmasters but still could not quite take the measure of World Chess Champion Garry Kasparov. In 1989, Kasparov scored 2-0 in a match against Deep Thought, a computer that could process 750,000 chess positions per second. Deep Thought was programmed to not concede until its opponent had a huge advantage and after the match Kasparov commented, "I think the computer needs to be taught something – how to resign!"24

In 1996, Kasparov played Deep Blue—the successor program to Deep Thought—and won 4-2, but in the 1997 rematch a new, more powerful Deep Blue beat Kasparov 3.5-2.5.25 Kasparov insisted that Deep Blue’s programmers cheated by providing some in-game assistance to Deep Blue.26 Whether or not Kasparov’s allegation was true, the point is that as recently as 1997 it still seemed incredible that a chess computer could play in an apparently creative style (as opposed to relying on brute calculation) and beat the reigning World Champion. Now, the paradigm has shifted and no one would think that a computer would need a human’s help during a chess game but there is a growing concern about humans covertly using computers to cheat at tournament chess.

In 2005, Michael Adams, the seventh ranked Grandmaster in the world at the time, lost 5.5-0.5 to a computer program called Hydra.27 The most powerful chess computers are challenging for even the strongest human players to face not only because of their raw calculation speed but also because a computer plays at the same level all of the time and is not affected by fatigue, stress, hunger and other factors that cause variability in a human’s performance. There is little interest in sponsoring human versus computer chess matches now because, in order for even the strongest human chess players to have a chance, the match would have to be short in duration and allow sufficient rest between each game or else the computers would have to give substantial odds in material and/or time on the clock.28

IS THAT A GRANDMASTER IN YOUR POCKET?

You could not sneak a desktop with Deep Blue into a chess tournament undetected but within the past decade or so chess computing software has been miniaturized to the extent that it can be used on a cell phone. In 2005, the program HIARCS Palm Chess Pro 13.1 defeated a Grandmaster in a match.29 Now, a person with the right equipment could show up at a chess tournament and receive undetected Grandmaster level advice at any point during a game.

One of the earliest instances of alleged chess cheating using chess computers and a cell phone happened at the 2005 HB Global Chess Challenge in Minneapolis, a tournament that featured a record-setting $500,000 prize fund.30 The tournament was divided into various sections, with prizes distributed to the highest scoring players in different rating classes, and in the last round a player who was competing for one of the rating class prizes was kicked out of the tournament after being caught speaking on his cell phone during his game.31 The tournament organizers suspected that this player was receiving moves from an accomplice in the building who was entering the game into a computer but they did not have to prove this to disqualify the player because the tournament’s rules explicitly prohibited any cell phone use for any reason during a game.32 The player’s games were not rated and a formal ethics complaint was filed against him with the USCF—but then this player showed up a few weeks later at the 2005 World Open, which offers the biggest annual prize fund in U.S. chess, and he tied for first place in his rating class, winning $5,833.33 World Open tournament director Bill Goichberg did not know that this player had been kicked out of the HB Global Chess Challenge for violating the anti-cheating rules but when Goichberg found out during the middle of the World Open he sought to disqualify the player.34 However, Goichberg could not prove that the player was cheating during the World Open and when the player threatened to take legal action if he was kicked out Goichberg backed down and let him stay in the tournament.35

These two different outcomes with the same player show the importance of tournament directors enacting strict anti-cheating rules prior to the start of an event and to the importance of tournament directors communicating with each other to keep track of cheaters and alleged cheaters; if Goichberg had known that this player had been kicked out of an event for cheating then Goichberg would likely have denied him entry into the World Open but once Goichberg accepted the player’s entry fee he could not kick the player out without proving that the player had cheated in the World Open specifically. As we will see, it can be difficult to prove that a player is cheating, which is why a rule prohibiting any cell phone use during a tournament is good, because such a rule automatically disqualifies a player who uses a cell phone without forcing the director to investigate the nature of the phone call; such an investigation could open up a host of legal issues, including right to privacy and right to avoid illegal search and seizure. It is much better for an organizer to set up anti-cheating rules in advance and make sure that the players know about and agree to abide by those rules than to permit players to enter an event and then try to determine on an ad hoc basis during the tournament who may be cheating.

Two separate instances of alleged cheating happened at the 2006 World Open. After that tournament, Goichberg, whose Continental Chess Association runs the World Open and many other large U.S. chess tournaments, spoke about how much technology had changed the chess tournament scene: “Before, a player might have discussed the position with someone who is a Grandmaster. That sounds terrible, but if the Grandmaster hasn’t seen your position, I don’t know if that is going to be much help. What is happening now is that the cheaters are concealing the fact that the moves are being transmitted to a computer.”36

Goichberg added that even though the new methods of electronic cheating are harder to detect than just observing a player speaking with a Grandmaster while his game is still in progress, there are some signs that indicate when a player is cheating, such as a player making sequences of moves that differ from typical human play, a player going through an entire game without making any mistakes and a player quickly showing significant improvement in his results, which is very unusual among adult players.37

Goichberg suspected that a player named Eugene Varshavsky was cheating at the 2006 World Open because Varshavsky fit the above profile.38 Varshavsky, who was rated slightly below Master level, beat three strong Masters and held another to a draw in the first four rounds of the event. He then lost to a Grandmaster but bounced back to beat Ilya Smirin, the Grandmaster with the highest USCF rating at that time.39 Goichberg asked Varshavsky to speak with him before the next round of the tournament but Varshavsky ducked into a bathroom and stayed there for 10 minutes. Goichberg waited for him to emerge and then received permission from Varshavsky to search him. No device or transmitter was found on Varshavsky, who during his games never removed a hat that fit tightly on his head.40 During the next round, Goichberg attempted to search the bathroom stall that Varshavsky had used but it remained occupied for 45 minutes by none other than Varshavsky. After Varshavsky finally left the stall, no incriminating evidence was discovered.41 Varshavsky lost his final two games of the event and did not qualify for a prize. The USCF did not rate Varshavsky’s suspicious games and eventually banned him from competing in USCF sanctioned events.42 Three years later, Varshavsky finished third in the National Sudoku Championship before being disqualified for cheating.43

The Varshavsky incident at the 2006 World Open raises several questions about preventing, detecting, and punishing chess cheating. In 2006, most chess tournaments did not have formal policies about computer-assisted cheating and tournament directors had to respond on the fly to suspicious situations, much like judges have to figure out how to apply old laws to new legal questions that arise as a result of the proliferation of social media networks. Goichberg never proved that Varshavsky was cheating and Varshavsky never admitted to cheating, but Varshavsky did not object to being searched at the tournament site and has not sought to be reinstated by the USCF—but what if Varshavsky had refused to be searched or had sued the USCF for banning him? How can a tournament director prove that a player is cheating if the tournament director does not catch the player in the act and how can the USCF ban a player without proof that the player cheated? Varshavsky did not openly use a cell phone or any other prohibited device, so he could not have been disqualified on those grounds even if the tournament had rules against such conduct.

Dr. Ken Regan, a Computer Science Professor at the University of Buffalo and an International Master, subsequently examined Varshavsky’s game versus Smirin and concluded that the results of his investigation “indicate a consistent narrative of cheating during the entire game.”44 Dr. Regan criticized the tendency of some people in “the chess world” to analyze the games of alleged chess cheaters “with no provision of data, methodology, logs, reports, anything to permit reproducibility of tests by others...These scientific fundamentals are overlooked amid need for due process with persons directly named and reputations involved.”45 Dr. Regan declared that his research was an effort “to remedy these lacks---you can dispute my methods but at least they're reviewable!”46 Dr. Regan concluded, “ [1] If someone cheats with more than one program, these methods can still detect cheating; and [2] Results alleging cheating with a specific program can be told apart from other programs (and possibly from versions of the same program). And both determinations can be made to accepted court standards of evidentiary statistics.”47

The latter point is critically important, because it provides a resource for tournament directors to use to both justify kicking a player out of a tournament and also to support such a decision if the expelled player decides to file a lawsuit in response to being disqualified. It is not at all farfetched to imagine a scenario in which a tournament director disqualifies a player for cheating based on the kind of analysis that Dr. Regan performs, whereupon that player sues (perhaps on a legal theory of recovering damages based on the prize that he could have won had he not been disqualified) and the court admits into evidence the kind of analysis that Dr. Regan performs because that analysis is valid expert testimony.

Nevertheless, Dr. Regan does not believe that his methods alone are enough to justify banning a player without some “physical or eyewitness evidence,” because Littlewood’s Law suggests that if a person plays 100 games “chances are at least one of them will match a given engine in a way that in isolation would be deemed to have a less than 1-in-a-thousand chance of happening without collusion. Hence other factors that in court cases go under the headings of ‘motive’ and ‘probable cause’ must be brought into play.”48

The second alleged chess cheating incident at the 2006 World Open involved a player named Steve Rosenberg who, unlike Varshavsky, was not playing in the tournament’s top section. Rosenberg was leading his section heading into the last round and one more win would have netted him a prize of about $18,000. Shortly after Rosenberg began playing his final game, several players reported hearing “whirring” noises emanating from a bathroom stall occupied by Rosenberg.49 Assistant tournament director Michael Atkins investigated these complaints, did not find any evidence of wrongdoing and instructed Rosenberg to not leave the playing area without being accompanied by a tournament director. Atkins also asked about a device in Rosenberg’s ear and Rosenberg said that it was a hearing aid.50 Oddly, Rosenberg was wearing large headphones over the alleged hearing aid but when Rosenberg’s opponent complained about the headphones Rosenberg complied with Atkins’ request to not wear the headphones (the tournament rules stipulated that a player could only wear headphones during a game if his opponent did not object).51

After several hours passed and after the lodging of several more complaints about Rosenberg, Atkins asked Rosenberg to remove the alleged hearing aid from his ear. Rosenberg put it in his pocket but Atkins insisted on examining the device.52 Atkins wrote down the device’s name and the name of a website that sold it. Subsequent investigation demonstrated that the device was not a hearing aid but that it was a “Phonito,” a wireless miniature communication receiver typically used with a signal booster worn around the neck.53 Atkins brought Rosenberg to the tournament director’s office, whereupon Rosenberg insisted that the device was a hearing aid but offered no explanation why he would seek to amplify sound with a hearing aid and then muffle sound with headphones.54 Rosenberg also refused to remove a bulky sweater that he had worn throughout the tournament and that could have been hiding a signal booster. Atkins then forfeited Rosenberg for cheating and Goichberg upheld that ruling. Rosenberg did not argue against the decision and merely asked to have the “Phonito” device returned to him.55

Rosenberg never contested his disqualification from the tournament or the USCF’s subsequent ban against him participating in their events. Atkins notes that Rosenberg went 18-0 in his three previous tournaments, an improbable score for a player at that rating level playing against other similarly rated players.56 If Rosenberg had contested the actions taken by Goichberg and/or the USCF, a strong evidentiary case could have been made against Rosenberg based on Rosenberg being caught with the “Phonito” device in his ear during the final round game, based on Dr. Regan-style computer analysis showing that Rosenberg’s games during the event matched up with computer moves to an unlikely degree and based on Rosenberg’s statistically improbable run of success prior to the World Open. The existence of that evidence, in addition to the available testimony of witnesses from the tournament about Rosenberg’s suspicious actions (including always wearing a heavy sweater indoors and consistently playing better right after making trips to the bathroom), probably explains why Rosenberg accepted his punishments without complaint.

As prizes are getting bigger, computers are getting stronger, and methods of communication are easier to conceal than ever before, it is becoming apparent that chess cheating is not limited to strong amateurs trying to make a quick financial score at one big tournament. Even Grandmasters have been caught cheating and the problem is so rampant that Grandmaster Nigel Short—the challenger for the 1993 World Chess Championship and still a top level performer—fears that smartphones will ruin chess as a competitive sport. Short says, “The basic problem is that it’s incredibly easy to cheat with a phone. You can have some application running on your phone, and it’s quite easy to conceal…My dog could win a major tournament using one of these devices. Or my grandmother. Anybody could do this.”57

One of the cases that particularly outraged Short happened in 2010 at the Chess Olympiad in Khanty-Mansiysk when Grandmaster Sebastian Feller, a member of the French team, cheated his way to a 5000 Euro prize during the sport’s most prestigious team event.58 The elaborate scheme involved Feller, Grandmaster Arnaud Hauchard (the captain of the French team) and International Master Cyril Marzolo, and it took place not just during the Chess Olympiad but also during the 2010 Paris Open and the 2010 Bienne Open.59 During each of those tournaments, Marzolo followed Feller’s games live on the internet, entered the moves into a computer engine and then sent coded SMS messages containing the computer’s recommended moves to Hauchard, who was present in the playing area and used prearranged signals to communicate the recommended moves to Grandmaster Feller.60 The French Chess Federation suspended Feller, Hauchard and Marzolo, but the Court of Appeals of Versailles overturned those suspensions, ruling that even though Marzolo was not the owner of the cell phone used in the cheating operation he had been properly granted usage of it and was therefore entitled to privacy, preventing the French Chess Federation from using the SMS messages as evidence.61 The editors of Chessbase.com, perhaps the leading chess news and information site, were not pleased that the conspirators eluded justice based on a technicality:

We have the following proposal, which would clear up the entire cheating scandal quickly: the accused players, Marzolo, Feller and Hauchard should waive their formal confidentiality rights and simply publish the SMS messages sent during the Olympiad, and especially during the games. They are stored by the mobile phone service provider for one year (this is compulsory) and can be easily retrieved if permission is granted by the user of the phone. If there are any clearly personal messages unrelated to the affair these can be filtered out by a clerk or a trusted person.

If our proposal is rejected then the players must tell us (and the chess public) why. It is as if a crime has been committed, a person stands accused, there is video surveillance tape, but the accused refuses to allow it to be used as evidence since it compromises his privacy rights. The final clarification of a very damaging scandal that has been going on for far too long takes precedence over abstract privacy concerns.62

Subsequently, FIDE excluded Hauchard from participation in FIDE events for three years, Feller for two years, nine months and Marzolo for one year, six months (with the final nine months of the punishment suspended).63  The defendants argued that this was purely an internal French matter and that since a French court had already overturned the French Chess Federation’s sanctions FIDE had no standing to issue any punishments, but FIDE rejected that theory of the case (in the quoted text, FF refers to the French Chess Federation and EC refers to FIDE’s Ethics Committee, the body that reviewed the case and handed down FIDE’s punishments):

The case concerns facts allegedly committed by members of the French Team during the 2010 Olympiad (the most important FIDE competition) in Khanty-Mansiysk (Russia): it seems difficult to even imagine that this could be a “French internal affair,” a question of exclusive competence of the FF, even more considering that any decision of the FF would have no direct effect for what concerns FIDE and other chess federations and that the same FF for these reasons addressed a complaint to the EC.64

FIDE’s belated punishment of Feller, Hauchard and Marzolo hardly seems to have deterred other cheaters, and Short is disappointed that the French team’s tainted result was not expunged from the official records of the 2010 Olympiad.65 In the 2015 Dubai Open, a tournament featuring 70 Grandmasters competing for a top prize of $12,000, Grandmaster Gaioz Nigalidze--the 25 year old two-time national champion of Georgia--was caught cheating and disqualified from the event.66  Short declares, “The benefits of this guy cheating are clear,” noting that prior to being caught Nigalidze had just won $11,000 at a tournament in Abu Dhabi.67 Nigalidze was caught after he repeatedly went to the bathroom during his game versus Armenian Grandmaster Tigran Petrosian, always visiting the same stall even when the others were not occupied.68 Petrosian complained about his opponent’s suspicious actions and the tournament officials inspected the toilet stall, finding an iPhone wrapped in toilet paper and hidden behind the toilet.69 Nigalidze initially denied that he owned the iPhone but the officials determined that it was logged into a social networking site under Nigalidze’s account and that the game’s current position was being analyzed in a chess application.70

EASY TO ACCUSE, DIFFICULT TO PROVE

In both the Varshavsky and Rosenberg cases, no one found a “smoking gun” (such as a cell phone with a relevant chess position displayed, as in the Nigalidze case) to prove that cheating had happened, but based on the overwhelming circumstantial evidence a reasonable person could conclude that the tournament directors acted appropriately by disqualifying those players. However, the fact that a player can be disqualified based on circumstantial evidence without clear proof of how the player cheated also means that in some ways the burden of proof in these situations seems to rest with the accused and not the accuser(s). This raises the possibility that a player could be falsely accused of cheating by a well-meaning but overzealous person or, even more disturbingly, a player could be falsely accused of cheating by a party who stands to gain by getting that player disqualified.

In the 2015 European Women’s Chess Championship, a Romanian player named Mihaela Sandu was only ranked 45th out of 98 players but she won her first five games in the 11 round event.71 After seven rounds when Sandu was tied for first place with one other player, 32 participants in the event drafted a letter to the organizers stating, in part, that they have “grave concern regarding raising suspicion of cheating in the tournament” and proposing that the organizers impose a 15 minute delay in the live internet transmission of the tournament’s games.72 A second letter, signed by 15 players, singled out Sandu by name and requested specifically that her final four games not be transmitted live but only be published after completion.73 Tournament director Giorgia Giorgadze responded with a written statement in which she agreed to delaying the transmission of all games, denied that there is any reason to suspect cheating during this particular tournament and encouraged the players who signed the second letter “to show their respect to their colleague and to withdraw their signatures.”74 Giorgadze reminded those 15 players that FIDE rules state that a false accusation of cheating may be punishable by sanctions ranging from just a warning up to and including disqualification from the tournament.75 Computer analysis of Sandu’s games suggested that she was not receiving any outside assistance.76

No one offered proof that Sandu cheated or even an example of her acting suspiciously in any way. Sandu fired back at her accusers in an open letter, declaring, “I am writing this letter to file a complaint about their behaviour. What they did was a very dirty attack, permanently damaging my name in the chess world. Also want to mention (Natalia) Zhukova's paltry behaviour is standing out as she was the main benefactor of the defamation campaign, making psychological attacks right before our game.”77 Sandu won the games that were broadcast live and lost the games during which the transmission was delayed, which could be seen as evidence that she had cheated earlier in the tournament—but it is at least as plausible to suggest that the controversy affected her concentration and/or that after legitimately scoring a few upsets her performance regressed to the mean.78 After defeating Sandu, Zhukova won the event with 9.5/11, while Sandu finished with 6/11 and tied for 26th-44th place.79 In his final report about the event, Albert Silver--a strong player and veteran chess commentator--declared, “After taking exactly one game at random, the win over Olga Girya in round four, it is quite clear the players signing the letter made no effort whatsoever to examine the case before making the accusations.”80

Somewhere in between the Nigalidze case of a cheater caught redhanded and the Sandu case of a player being accused without any substantiating evidence is the curious Borislav Ivanov story. The Bulgarian player Ivanov burst onto the scene in late 2012 and early 2013 with a series of spectacular results far in excess of what would be expected based on his rating.81 At one tournament, Ivanov was strip searched but the search did not reveal any evidence of cheating.82 Ivanov produced great results followed by mediocre results, leading one strong player to speculate that part of Ivanov’s plan to avoid detection was to utilize at least three different playing styles: one style using the computer program Houdini set up to play for a win, one style using the computer program Houdini set up to play for a draw and a third style involving Ivanov playing on his own with no assistance.83  Dr. Regan determined that based on how often Ivanov’s moves matched the top choice of the computer engines during one of Ivanov’s successful tournaments the evidence could not be any stronger than Ivanov was cheating.84 After several Bulgarian players refused to play against Ivanov in April 2013 and Ivanov responded by publicly insulting those players, the Bulgarian Chess Federation (BCF) suspended Ivanov for four months—not for cheating but for making comments that bring dishonor to the sport.85 The BCF won a lawsuit that Ivanov filed to contest his suspension and the BCF also set up an anti-cheating test that Ivanov agreed to attend on June 19, 2013.86 However, at the last minute Ivanov decided to not show up, whereupon the BCF declared that when the suspension ended he would be permitted to play in Bulgarian tournaments “but the final decision on whether he can play will be made solely by the tournament organizers.”87 After several more incidents at various tournaments—including one occasion when Ivanov refused to take off his shoes and another when he fled a tournament after some sort of concealed device was discovered on his back—the Bulgarian Chess Federation banned Ivanov in December 2013.88 To this day, no one has conclusively proven that Ivanov cheated and/or how he avoided being caught, but his suspicious behavior during games (including making all of his moves in a very short period of time, regardless of the complexity of the position) and the high percentage of his moves that correlated with the top choices of computer engines make it seem likely that Ivanov cheated.

The documented instances of chess cheating demonstrate that this is a serious problem that must be addressed but the Sandu situation shows that false—or, at the very least, unsubstantiated—accusations also present a serious problem, one that in the long run can cause great damage to the sport in addition to harming the reputation of innocent competitors.

CONCLUSION

The cliché “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” applies to the prevention, detection, and punishment of chess cheating in the digital age. There is no perfect solution to this problem but emphasis should be placed on trying to prevent cheating in the first place. In the wake of the two incidents at the 2006 World Open, Bill Goichberg instituted several anti-cheating rules, including banning headphones, earphones, cell phones and hearing aids, plus a provision that all participants agree that they can be disqualified if they refuse an official request to be searched for electronic devices.89 Goichberg presciently stated that the greatest threat was the combination of a chess engine and wireless communication to an accomplice outside of the playing area but noted that it would not be possible for organizers to use signal-jamming equipment due to a Federal Communications Commission rule that bans such use in the United States.90 Another good preventative measure is to delay internet broadcasting of moves to make it difficult for outsiders to analyze games in real time, an approach that is being adopted with increasing regularity by big international tournaments.

The second Millionaire Chess Open, scheduled to take place in Las Vegas from October 8-12, 2015, forbids any player from using or wearing electronic devices of any kind, including “phone, blackberry, PDA, computer, ear-piece, headset, communications device, microphone, speaker or the like while playing without the expressed written permission of a Tournament Director (doctors on call included).” Every player will be screened by security prior to entering the playing area and no player is allowed to leave the playing area while his game is in progress.91

Regarding detection, games with a large prize fund at stake should be subjected to computer analysis to determine if a player’s moves improbably line up with the computer’s top choices. As Dr. Regan notes, this is not dispositive evidence of cheating but--combined with eyewitness testimony and physical evidence--it can be used to make a case against a cheater.

Chess is an international game governed by a variety of national and local laws and a variety of international, national and local chess federations. Therefore, punishment of chess cheaters will not be uniform--and governments may have much less interest in pursuing such cases than chess federations do. The potential rewards of chess cheating are great in terms of money and prestige (such as championships won and titles gained), so the punishments must also be great. Grandmaster Short notes, “It’s almost impossible to police. So I think when a person gets caught in this way, there has to be really draconian punishment so that people think twice…if I were to take drugs--some sort of steroids or whatever--I will still never be able to win the 100 meters or the Tour de France, because I simply don’t have the physique for this. But any club player could win an international tournament if he’s using this sort of device.”92

In the wake of the Nigalidze incident, Short does not think that it is enough for just FIDE to punish chess cheaters. “I would like to see criminal charges for fraud, because this is what he did. If you use some sort of electronic device to break into an ATM and help yourself to cash, if you are discovered you will be prosecuted. This guy is defrauding other professionals, the other participants in the tournament.”93

At the 2006 New York Conference about Chess Cheating, Nelson Farber, a Manhattan-based attorney, said that legal authority exists to prosecute cheaters under either common law ("larceny by trick" in the New York State penal code) or civil racketeering (RICO) statutes.94 However, Farber noted that "prosecuting chess cheating is not likely to be a priority of District Attorneys and U.S. Attorneys” and he suggested that instead of seeking help from law enforcement chess organizations focus on policing chess cheating on their own.95 It is critically important for chess organizers to develop standardized anti-cheating measures, because this makes it less probable that their rulings would be second guessed by a court if a disqualified player files a lawsuit and because this makes it more probable that accused players receive a fair hearing.96 Farber’s specific suggestions included (1) gaining consent from players that the anti-cheating procedures are binding, (2) providing immunity for the tournament directors as decision makers in such matters, (3) instituting methods to protect privacy if personal searches are necessary and (4) the use of a “fair preponderance of the evidence” standard (the general standard applied in civil cases) when determining whether or not a player has cheated.97  Farber added that it should be included in tournament rules that a director’s decision about whether or not a player cheated is final and not subject to being overturned subsequently, at least in terms of changing who won a prize.98 Farber cited a 1991 New York case--Vaccaro v. Joyce, 154 Misc.2d 643 (N.Y. Misc. 1991)-- in which a horse-race bettor’s claim for damages due to a recording error was rejected because “There must be one final and determinative call, no matter what a subsequent review may show.”99 Farber noted that courts are hesitant to overrule a decision maker unless it can be proven that the decision was "arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent."100 Farber added that a player who is disqualified from a tournament should have his case reviewed by the USCF Ethics Committee and Executive Board for possible further discipline and that this subsequent review should perhaps be conducted under the stricter clear and convincing evidence standard even though it would not be legally required to use that standard.101

If those procedures are followed and a player is found guilty, then what? Grandmaster Alex Stripunsky proposed a mandatory three year ban for a first offense and a lifetime ban for a second offense.102  I would take things even further. Someone who is caught in the act of cheating with physical evidence proving the cheating should be banned from tournament play for at least five years and should be forced to return any prizes won while cheating. Someone who is disqualified for cheating based on a preponderance of circumstantial evidence should be banned from tournament play for at least two years and should be forced to return any prizes won while cheating. Repeat offenders in either category should be banned for life. These rules should be incorporated into the bylaws of national chess federations and FIDE and bans issued by one such body should be enforced by all other such bodies.

Chess cheating is a serious problem that threatens the very future of the sport and strong measures are necessary to prevent, detect, and punish chess cheating so that the sport does not lose all credibility in the eyes of participants, fans and the general public.

Notes

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INTRODUCTION: THE GAME OF KINGS, PLAYED BY KINGS

1. Dylan Loeb McClain, Cheating Accusations in Mental Sports, Too, NEW YORK TIMES (August 8, 2006).

2. Richard Eales, CHESS: THE HISTORY OF A GAME, p. 35 (Facts on File Publications, 1985).

3. Id., p. 39.

4. Id., p. 72.

5. Id., p. 76.

6. U.S. CHESS FEDERATION’S OFFICIAL RULES OF CHESS, pp. 7, 17-21 (6th Edition, 2014).

7. William Hartston, THE KINGS OF CHESS, p. 12 (Pavilion Books Limited, 1985).

8. Id., p. 12.

9. Id., p. 14.

 

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CHESS

 

10. Bill Wall, The Chess Clock—A History, http://www.chessmaniac.com/the-chess-clock-a-history/ (June 11, 2012).

11. Id.

12. Adjournment, http://www.chess.com/chessopedia/view/adjournment (March 10, 2008)

13. Olimpiu G. Urcan, Chess: A Singapore Scrapbook, http://sgchess.net/2012/11/08/adjournment-nostalgia/ (November 8, 2012).

14. Mike Petersen, Adjournments—An Outdated Practice, http://www.chess.com/article/view/the-open-file---adjournments-an-outdated-practice (July 9, 2010).

 

THE SILICON MONSTER CHANGES THE GAME

 

15. Garry Kasparov, The Chess Master and the Computer, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (February 11, 2010).

16. Id.

17. David Levy and Monty Newborn, HOW COMPUTERS PLAY CHESS, pp. 67-68 (W.H. Freeman and Company, 1991).

18. Id., p. 70.

19. Id., p. 89.

20. Id., pp. 92-93

21. Id., pp. 96-101

22. Id., p. 102.

23. Finlo Rohrer, The Unwinnable Game, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25032298 (November 24, 2013).

24. Ram Prasad, Man vs. Machine—the endless fascination, http://en.chessbase.com/post/man-vs-machine-the-endle-fascination (November 9, 2003).

25. Id.

26. Rudy Chelminski, This Time It’s Personal,

http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/9.10/chess.html (October 2001).

27. Adams vs. Hydra: Man 0.5-Machine 5.5,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/adams-vs-hydra-man-0-5-machine-5-5 (June 28, 2005).

28. Dylan Loeb McClain, Man vs. Computer Match Ends in Victory for…Man, but With a Catch, NEW YORK TIMES (October 1, 2008).

 

 

IS THAT A GRANDMASTER IN YOUR POCKET?

 

29. Palm Chess Hiarcs, http://www.hiarcs.com/palm_hiarcs.htm (page last modified on February 19, 2014).

30. Malcolm Pein, The $0.5 Million Chess Challenge, THE TELEGRAPH (April 4, 2005).

31. Blockade Chess Cheaters: USCF Petition, https://archive.is/uVzrG (November, 2005).

32. Id.

33. Id.

34. Id.

35. Id.

36. Dylan Loeb McClain, Cheating Accusations in Mental Sports, Too, NEW YORK TIMES (August 8, 2006).

37. Id.

38. Id.

39. Id.

40. Id.

41. Id.

42. U.S. Chess Federation Membership Suspensions,

http://archive.uschess.org/tds/suspension.html (updated August 19, 2008).

43. All About Sudoku, http://about-sudokus.blogspot.com/2009/11/eugene-varshavsky-disqualified-based-on.html (November 23, 2009).

44. Ken Regan, World Open Testing, http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~regan/chess/fidelity/Varshavsky.html (May 24, 2007).

45. Id.

46. Id.

47. Id.

48. Id.

49. Cheating at the World Open—More Details,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/cheating-at-the-world-open-more-details (August 17, 2006).

50. Id.

51. Id.

52. Id.

53. Id.

54. Id.

55. Id.

56. Id.

57. Michael E. Miller, Chess Grandmaster Accused of Using iPhone to Cheat During International Tournament, WASHINGTON POST (April 14, 2015).

58. FIDE Confirms Sanctions in French Chess Cheating Case,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/fide-confirms-sanctions-in-french-cheating-case (July 30, 2012).

59. Id.

60. Id.

61. Judgment Rendered by the FIDE Ethics Commission Case N. 2/2011, p. 7 (July 1, 2012).

62. Feller’s Interview and a Solution to the Cheating Scandal,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/feller-s-interview-and-a-solution-to-the-cheating-scandal (August 23, 2011).

63. Judgment Rendered by the FIDE Ethics Commission Case N. 2/2011, p. 24 (July 1, 2012).

64. Id., p. 9.

65. Michael E. Miller, Chess Grandmaster Accused of Using iPhone to Cheat During International Tournament, WASHINGTON POST (April 14, 2015).

66. Id.

67. Id.

68. Id.

69. Id.

70. Id.

 

EASY TO ACCUSE, DIFFICULT TO PROVE

 

71. Frederic Friedel, Suspicion at the European Women’s Championship,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/suspicion-at-the-european-women-s-championship (May 29, 2015).

72. Id.

73. Id.

74. Id.

75. Id.

76. Id.

77. Support for Mihaela Sandu,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/support-for-mihaela-sandu (May 30, 2015).

78. Id.

79. European Women CC Won by Zhukova,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/european-women-cc-is-won-by-natalia-zhukova (June 1, 2015).

80. Id.

81. Alex Karaivanov, A Game of Chicken: Ivanov Rides Again,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/a-game-of-chicken-ivanov-rides-again-230313 (March 23, 2013).

82. Id.

83. Id.

84. Alex Karaivanov, Experts Weigh in on Ivanov’s Performance,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/experts-weigh-in-on-ivanovs-performance-060613 (June 5, 2013).

85. Alex Karaivanov, The Show Goes on: Ivanov in Kustendil,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/the-show-goes-on-ivanov-in-kustendil-160613 (June 3, 2013).

86. Alex Karaivanov, Ivanov Misses BCF Anti-Cheating Test,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/ivanov-mies-bcf-anti-cheating-test-120713 (July 11, 2013).

87. Id.

88. Peter Doggers, Ivanov Again Suspended by Bulgarian Chess Federation,

http://www.chess.com/news/ivanov-again-suspended-by-bulgarian-chess-federation-2458 (December 22, 2013).

 

CONCLUSION

 

89. Minutes of the Chess Cheating Conference in New York,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/minutes-of-the-che-cheating-conference-in-new-york (January 11, 2007).

90. Id.

91. Millionaire Chess Tournament Policies, https://millionairechess.com/tournament-policies.

92. Michael E. Miller, Chess Grandmaster Accused of Using iPhone to Cheat During International Tournament, WASHINGTON POST (April 14, 2015).

93. Id.

94. Minutes of the Chess Cheating Conference in New York,

http://en.chessbase.com/post/minutes-of-the-che-cheating-conference-in-new-york (January 11, 2007).

95. Id.

96. Id.

97. Id.

98. Id.

99. Id.

100. Id.

101. Id.

102. Id.

Friday, July 9, 2021

Former U.S. Chess Champion Sam Shankland on Why it is Important to Set Lofty Goals

I love this quote from Sam Shankland, the 2018 U.S. Chess Champion who has been ranked as high as 24th in the world and is currently ranked 31st in the world:

I've always believed in lofty goals: my goal is to be the World Champion. Now--I think this is very unlikely to happen, and my odds for this are significantly lower than one percent. But I can guarantee you it will not happen if I don't try my best, if I don't throw myself at it with full force. Ultimately, I think that you should be setting lofty goals for yourself...what's that expression? "Shoot for the moon. Even if you miss, you'll land among the stars." If my goal was to make the top ten in the world, I would peak at number ten. But if my goal is to be world champion, and I peak at number five? Even though I technically fail the second goal, I think I will be much happier with myself and my career.

The full interview at Chess Life Online provides some chess-specific insights from Shankland, but the above quote has universal applicability. Life is too short and too precious to set "realistic" goals. Shoot for the moon, and do so with every mental, physical, and emotional fiber you can muster. You may not reach the moon, but you will soar past many people who lack your daring, courage, and vision!

Tuesday, April 6, 2021

Baylor Dominates Gonzaga to Win the 2021 NCAA Title

Baylor took a 9-0 lead over Gonzaga in the NCAA Championship Game en route to a wire to wire victory over the previously undefeated Bulldogs. Jared Butler led Baylor with 22 points and seven assists to become the first player to post at least 20 points and at least seven assists in the NCAA Championship Game since Carmelo Anthony did this for Syracuse in 2003. Butler, like Anthony, won the Final Four Most Outstanding Player award. 

Gonzaga is the fifth team since 1976 to enter the NCAA Tournament with an undefeated record, and the fifth such team to not win the title. The last NCAA Division I basketball team to cap off an undefeated regular season with an NCAA title is Bobby Knight's 1976 Indiana Hoosiers. Just seven Division I teams have had an undefeated championship season, starting with the 1956 University of San Francisco team (coached by Phil Woolpert and led by Hall of Fame center Bill Russell), followed by the 1957 North Carolina team coached by Frank McGuire, and then four UCLA teams coached by John Wooden (1964, 1967, 1972, 1973). Coach Knight, who often publicly expressed his disdain for the improper benefits UCLA provided to its players (which, if uncovered at the time, could have resulted in the disqualification of those championship teams), must have taken great joy in eliminating UCLA from the 1976 tournament as part of Indiana's perfect season, even though Wooden had retired by that time and passed the baton to Gene Bartow.

In his Foreword to Runnin' Rebel (Jerry Tarkanian's autobiography, co-authored with Dan Wetzel), Coach Knight identified two ingredients for success "over the long haul of a season": "getting players to play as hard as they can play each possession of the game at both ends of the floor and doing it as intelligently as possible." Coach Knight declared that he has never seen another coach consistently do a better job of this than Coach Tarkanian did. Coach Knight further stated that three key elements for success are getting players to run back on defense, getting players to attack the boards aggressively, and getting players to commit to playing defense. 

While dominating Gonzaga, Baylor put on a 40 minute clinic exemplifying all of the ingredients and elements mentioned above by Coach Knight. Anyone who focuses on Baylor's 10-23 three point shooting does not understand why Butler beat Gonzaga, as simple math demonstrates: take away the three point shot--subtract one point for each three pointer that Baylor made--and Baylor still wins the game. Baylor would have won that game without the three point shot rule because the crucial elements for Baylor's success are defense and rebounding. Defense and rebounding shut down Gonzaga's high-powered offensive attack while also creating numerous scoring opportunities for Baylor.

Baylor set the tone on the very first possession of the game, as they pounded Gonzaga on the glass until they finally scored. Mark Vital finished with a game-high 11 rebounds, including a game-high eight offensive rebounds, and the 6-5, 250 senior had half as many rebounds as Gonzaga's entire squad as Baylor dominated the boards, 38-22. 

Baylor's pressure defense not only forced turnovers, but it destroyed Gonzaga's rhythm, turning normally confident players into hesitant players. Soon the Bulldogs were bobbling and fumbling the ball even before Baylor applied pressure. 

It became evident that Baylor is the superior team athletically, but that should not overshadow the fact that Baylor also was the more physical team and the more mentally poised team; the Bears showed no fear from the outset, they played a very disciplined game at both ends of the court, and they made an undefeated, confident team look very beatable and not very confident.

Rules may change, and styles may evolve, but championship basketball has always been about fundamentals. No matter how good a team is offensively, a team can go on a cold streak and miss shots. Defense and rebounding are all about effort, toughness, and focus; well-coached teams comprised of mentally-focused, tough players play with effort, toughness, and focus every game, which means that they force other teams to shoot poorly while also being able to, if necessary, survive when they shoot poorly. Although Baylor shot well from three point range, the Bears did not shoot a great field goal percentage overall (.448), and they attempted fewer free throws than Gonzaga, but Baylor's defensive pressure and rebounding prowess generated 67 field goal attempts while limiting Gonzaga to 49 field goal attempts. 

---

Further Reading:

Early Entry Players Have Diluted Both College and Pro Basketball (March 2008) 

C(h)alm in the Clutch: Kansas Defeats Memphis in OT, 75-68 (2008 NCAA Championship) 

Heels Stomp Spartans (2009 NCAA Championship)

Separating the Grownups From the Kids in Basketball (November 2018)

Sunday, March 14, 2021

Reflections on the Passing of Marvelous Marvin Hagler

You just never know how long life will last, or when/how it will end.

Boxers do not tend to have long, healthy, and productive post-retirement lives, but if any boxer could have been expected to achieve all three of those goals that boxer would have been Marvelous Marvin Hagler, a boxer so prideful that he changed his legal name from Marvin Nathaniel Hagler to Marvelous Marvin Hagler because TV networks did not always refer to him by his preferred designation. A boxer's pride is often his downfall, as many boxers fight long past their primes for big prizes (and, sometimes, small prizes) for which they pay a supreme price as they get older--but Marvelous Marvin Hagler left the fight game on top, the people's champion if not the official champion, and he rebuffed all efforts to bring him back in the ring. When his rival Sugar Ray Leonard tried to entice him back, Hagler retorted to an intermediary, "Tell Ray to get a life."

Hagler had a wonderful post-boxing life, enjoying being an actor in Italy while also spending time with his family. He never looked back with regret, he never returned to the ring, and whenever he was interviewed he spoke with a clear mind and a strong voice that are rare for retired boxers as they get older. Every time I heard him speak I thought that he might be the rare boxer who reached the top, stayed there for a long time, and left the ring with a chance to live to an old age with his faculties intact.

Perhaps I should not be shocked by his death, or by any death, considering how tenuous life can be, and how many tragic deaths and events have happened in the past year or so.

Hagler will always be remembered as one of the greatest boxers of all-time. Hagler achieved a 62-3-2 career record with 52 knockouts against fighters who had an aggregate record of 444-25-6 at the time he faced them; he battled against nearly unbeatable fighters and, in most cases, he beat them. Boxing Illustrated named Hagler the Fighter of the Decade for the 1980s, while The Ring twice honored him as Fighter of the Year and ranked him as the fourth greatest middleweight of all-time. Hagler's rivalries with Sugar Ray Leonard, Roberto Duran, and Thomas "The Hitman" Hearns helped to make the 1980s a golden age for boxing. 

Hagler's most celebrated victory featured perhaps the greatest round of all-time. In a April 16, 1985 match versus Hearns that is forever known as "The War," the two legendary champions threw a flurry of punches in a three round battle royale that culminated in Hagler knocking out Hearns, adding a crown jewel to Hagler's nine year winning streak. After the bout, Hagler said, "You have to take something to get something." Hearns, who lost for just the second time, commented, "I hope the people got their money's worth."

Hagler successfully defended his middleweight championship belt 12 times, and Hagler was the consensus middleweight champion from 1980 until he lost a controversial split decision to Sugar Ray Leonard in 1987. Hagler initially wanted a rematch with Leonard, but after Leonard refused Hagler moved on and Hagler never looked back, enjoying his post-boxing life to the fullest.

You just never know. Rest in peace, Marvelous Marvin Hagler.

Monday, March 1, 2021

"Bobby Fischer and His World" Paints a Detailed Picture of the Life of a Mercurial Genius

Introduction

International Master John Donaldson, author of several chess books and long-time captain of Team USA's squad in various international chess competitions, has written Bobby Fischer and His World, a 644 page biography spanning Fischer's entire life, from young American chess champion to retired chess champion living (and, eventually, dying) in self-imposed exile in Iceland. The book contains 99 annotated games, including some games that had not been previously published; not all of the games were played by Fischer, and there are some interesting games played by his mentors, contemporaries, and rivals.

Bobby Fischer set numerous records, including youngest U.S. Chess champion (14), youngest Grandmaster (15), most U.S. Chess Championships won (eight, including a record-setting 11-0 performance in the 1963-64 event), and highest chess rating ever. Although Fischer's records for being the youngest Grandmaster and the highest rated chess player ever were both broken--decades after he set those marks--the dominance that he achieved over his contemporaries is perhaps unmatched in recorded chess history; when Fischer was a 15 year old Grandmaster it was rare for anyone to achieve that title as a teenager (now, a teenager becoming a Grandmaster is not even a newsworthy event), and when he set the FIDE rating record (2785) that stood for nearly 20 years the next highest rated player was rated 125 points--more than half of a rating class!--lower than he was. It is not an exaggeration to say that Fischer--both as a teenage prodigy, and as an adult champion--was in a class by himself.

This review does not have the same organizational structure as the book (the book takes some interesting non-chronological digressions), but examines Fischer's life--as depicted in the book but also as depicted in other sources--in chronological order. It should be noted that Donaldson has stated that his goal was to focus on questions that he always had about Fischer that he had not seen answered in other sources; therefore, Donaldson's book does not provide as much coverage of some of Fischer's greatest triumphs as the reader might expect, for the simple reason that those triumphs have already been thoroughly covered.

Bobby Fischer's Early Years

Ratings are a ubiquitous part of the chess scene for tournament players, many of whom may not know much about the history and evolution of the rating system. The U.S. Chess Federation first published a ratings list in 1950. At that time, any player who achieved a rating of 2300 was classified as a Master, a player rated between 2500-2699 was designated as a Senior Master, and a player rated above 2700 was classified as a Grandmaster (this U.S. title had no connection with the Grandmaster title awarded by the International Chess Federation, an organization usually referred to by the French acronym FIDE). Those rating classes remained the same until 1956, when Master status was redefined as 2200-2399, Senior Master status was redefined as 2400-2599, and Grandmaster status was redefined as any rating above 2600. At some point--perhaps around the time that FIDE started publishing its own rating list in addition to awarding the Grandmaster title to select players--the U.S. Chess Federation dropped the Grandmaster rating class, and subsequently the Grandmaster title referred exclusively to the FIDE honor.

The U.S. Chess Federation only had a few thousand members when Fischer began competing in rated events (the USCF now has over 90,000 members), and less than 50 of those players were rated at Master level or above. Fischer's first official rating in 1955 at the age of 12 was a little over 1700, which means that he was a strong club player but not yet a prodigy. Fischer tied for 11th-21st place in the 1955 U.S. Junior Championship with a score of 5/10. The winner, 15 year old Charles Kalme, scored 9/10, while the second place finisher--13 year old Larry Remlinger--scored 7.5/10. Just two years later, Fischer had emerged from the middle of the elite junior pack to the top of the heap in the entire country, scoring 10.5/13 to claim his first U.S. Championship. Along the way, he also captured the 1957 U.S. Junior Championship by scoring 8.5/9 (one point ahead of the field), and he improved his U.S. rating from 1726 (in the summer of 1956) to 2626 (January 1958)--a staggering rating increase that may never be seen again: in less than two years Fischer leaped from being a very strong club player to being the strongest player in the United States!

Only a genius of the rarest type can develop in the manner that Fischer did, and then reach the unprecedented heights he reached--but it must be noted that Fischer was obsessed with chess, practicing for several hours a day, and learning foreign languages at least to the extent that he could read chess literature from other countries. Saying that Fischer was "obsessed with chess" is not a value judgment--the reader can decide if such an obsession is good, bad, or neutral--but rather a statement of fact. Fischer focused on chess to the exclusion of almost everything else, and that extreme focus combined with his extraordinary talent produced a nearly unbeatable chess champion. To deny either the talent part of this equation or the obsessive work part of this equation is to deny reality. 

By the time that the 14 year old Fischer was twice U.S. Junior champion and just a few months away from becoming the youngest U.S. chess champion ever, his mother Regina was already publicly expressing reservations about his obsession with chess: "It's chess, chess, chess from the minute he opens his eyes in the morning," she declared in a nationally syndicated article published on October 27, 1957, and reprinted on pages 130-131 of Donaldson's book. She stated that he gets along well with his peers, but that she was nevertheless concerned about his future: "Maybe when he gets older he'll change. I want my Bobby to develop like other boys." 

Despite her misgivings, Regina Fischer made sure that her son had opportunities to play in tournaments, and as he became older she was very zealous in trying to obtain funding for him to travel to bigger events. Fischer's relationship with his mother was complex, but it is apparent that Fischer's devotion to chess increasingly isolated him from anyone who he felt was not helping him to maximize his talent and reach his goals. His mother's concerns about Fischer focusing too much on chess are similar to how Owen Lars, Luke Skywalker's uncle in "Star Wars," tried to keep young Skywalker from attending the Academy to become a pilot. Aunt Beru chides Uncle Owen that Luke is just not cut out to be a moisture farmer because he has too much of his father in him, and Uncle Owen replies that this is what he fears. The point is that parents, relatives, and concerned friends can try to guide a youngster, but ultimately the youngster is going to follow his own path, and he should be encouraged to do so in the most productive possible way. No one is going to convince Bobby Fischer to not play chess, or Luke Skywalker to not learn the ways of the Force, and trying to do so just creates frustration and conflict.

Fischer earned the International Master title and qualified to participate in the Interzonal Tournament by winning the 1957-58 U.S. Championship. The top six finishers in the Interzonal would advance to the Candidates Tournament, and the winner of the Candidates Tournament would play a title match versus World Champion Mikhail Botvinnik.

Fischer made his first and only trip to the Soviet Union in 1958, just prior to his participation in the Interzonal Tournament in Yugoslavia. Fischer's travel plans were not finalized until after he was a successful contestant on the game show "I've Got a Secret": he won airfare for two (his sister Joan accompanied him) for the European adventure. Donaldson asserts that Fischer's "short stay in Moscow had a major impact on his life. Prior to his trip, Bobby thought of Soviet Chess in a positive way--his attitude completely changed within a week of setting foot in the USSR" (p. 147).

Donaldson notes the lack of reliable accounts of Fischer's experiences in the Soviet Union; the exact itinerary is not even available, although Donaldson was able to piece together enough information from multiple sources to conclude that Fischer and his sister likely "left New York around June 19, spent a long weekend in Brussels (June 20-22), flew to Moscow (June 23), and then onward to Belgrade (July 9)" (p. 157). Donaldson does his typical thorough and methodical job of organizing and presenting the material that is available. It has been reported that Fischer expected/demanded to play against Botvinnik, and that when Soviet authorities informed Fischer that the World Champion would not play him but that the Soviet Union has hundreds of strong players who can play decently Fischer retorted, "There are only about a dozen players in the Soviet Union that can play decently" (p. 156). Donaldson finds that story credible, and it certainly aligns with how Fischer thought about himself and how he expressed himself. Donaldson also states that Fischer had little interest in exploring the city, and would have been most happy to just camp out all day playing chess at the Moscow Chess Club.

Fischer had a much more enjoyable experience in Yugoslavia, where he was welcomed warmly and where he played several training games before the Interzonal; Fischer had not played any serious tournaments or matches for the previous several months after winning the U.S. Championship, so he needed to scrape off some rust before making his first attempt to become World Champion. 

Fischer scored 12/20 (six wins, 12 draws, two losses) and finished =5th-6th in the Portoroz Interzonal, and thus he qualified for the 1959 Candidates Tournament. At just 15 years old, Fischer became the youngest Grandmaster ever, a record that stood until 1991. Fischer also became the youngest Candidate ever, a distinction he retained until 2005 when a slightly younger Magnus Carlsen qualified as a Candidate under a different system. 

Fischer scored 12.5/28 in the eight player quadruple round robin Candidates Tournament (also held in Yugoslavia), finishing =5th-6th. He lost all four of his games to tournament winner Mikhail Tal, who scored 20/28. Tal subsequently defeated Botvinnik to become the youngest World Champion ever, a record he held until Garry Kasparov broke it in 1985.

U.S. Champion but not World Champion

In late 1960, Regina Fischer moved from New York to San Francisco. Fischer's sister Joan had already gotten married and moved out of the family apartment, so the 17 year old Fischer was now living by himself. His maternal grandfather Jacob Wender had made a bequest of $14,000 (which Donaldson states is equivalent to $122,000 in 2020), and Regina placed those funds in a trust that provided $175 per month to Fischer. This enabled him to pay the rent and basic expenses without having to rely on prize money (or get a job). Fischer had dropped out of high school prior to his mother's departure, and now he could spend all of his time studying chess without anyone or anything to distract him.

Donaldson devotes an entire chapter to the controversial 1961 match between Fischer and Sammy Reshevsky. Reshevsky began his chess career as a child prodigy who--as a child--supported his family by giving simultaneous chess exhibitions. Donaldson writes that Reshevsky's parents had to go to court after being charged with not being proper guardians because they failed to provide adequate schooling for their son. The case was dismissed, and soon after that Julius Rosenwald, part-owner of Sears-Roebuck, became Reshevsky's benefactor, enabling Reshevsky to complete his education. 

Reshevsky took several years off from competitive chess to go to college and establish himself as an accountant so that he could support his wife and three children. It is remarkable that after such a long absence he was able to return to the sport and dominate U.S. chess from the 1930s until Fischer's emergence in the late 1950s. Reshevsky's job and family obligations meant that he could never devote himself fully to chess. He received some funding from various benefactors and organizations, but nothing approaching the support given to the top Soviet players during that era.

The Fischer-Reshevsky match was a battle of the generations, and a battle of geniuses who had different life perspectives/viewpoints. Reshevsky was an Orthodox Jew who did not play chess on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath. Donaldson mentions that other prominent observant Jewish Grandmasters such as Leonid Yudasin and Boris Gulko later played on Saturdays provided that they had an assistant to write down their moves and punch their clock (the Jewish Sabbath rules do not apply to playing chess but rather to tasks such as keeping score and utilizing the clock that ensures that tournament games finish on schedule). Fischer was Jewish by heritage but he was never an observant Jew, and of course he eventually became a quite outspoken antisemite. Ironically, after Fischer joined the Worldwide Church of God he refused to play on Saturdays so that he could observe that church's Sabbath, and at the Sousse Interzonal in 1967 both Fischer and Reshevsky refused to play before sundown on Saturdays!

The match was scheduled to last 16 games, with eight to be played in New York City and eight to be played in Los Angeles. All games were supposed to be played even if one player clinched victory by scoring 8.5 points prior to the 16th game. Reshevsky was a formidable match player, and even though Fischer had won four straight U.S. titles by the time he faced Reshevsky most commentators who made public predictions expected Reshevsky to prevail.

The match was tied 5.5-5.5 after Fischer missed an opportunity to win game 11 and had to settle for a draw. Game 12 was scheduled to be played at 7:30 p.m. on August 12, but match sponsor Jacqueline Piatigorsky rescheduled the game for the following morning so that she could watch her husband, renowned cellist Gregor Piatigorsky, perform for the first time with legendary violinist Jascha Heifetz. Fischer objected to changing the terms of the match contract, so he was deemed the forfeit loser of game 12. After Fischer did not appear for game 13 he lost that game by forfeit. Subsequently, Reshevsky was declared the winner of the match, and Reshevsky received the winner's 60% share of the purse. An outraged Fischer filed suit not against Piatigorsky but against Reshevsky, seeking a court order preventing Reshevsky from participating in any other chess events until he returned the prize money and agreed to play the final five games of the match. The two parties reached an undisclosed out of court settlement. Fischer apparently did not harbor lasting bad feelings toward the Piatigorskys, as he accepted their invitation to play in the Second Piatigorsky Cup tournament in 1966.

Despite the acrimony associated with the match, Fischer respected Reshevsky as a chess player, and a few years later Fischer wrote an article about the greatest chess masters in which he asserted that Reshevsky was probably the strongest player in the world in the 1950s, even though Reshevsky never earned the right to challenge the World Champion in a title match.

The next chapter in Donaldson's book, spanning just three pages, is about Fischer's antisemitism. It is not clear that 30 pages would be enough to try to plumb the depths of Fischer's depraved hatred but it is clear that three pages are not enough. Donaldson focuses on speculation that the sour ending to the Reshevsky match is what triggered Fischer's antisemitism, but it is evident that is not the case, and Donaldson even quotes Pal Benko stating that Fischer's "mental problems already showed when he was very young" (p. 248). Benko recalled that the 16 year old Fischer showed him a picture of Adolf Hitler while stating that Hitler was a great man. Benko offered this blunt assessment of Fischer: "He could not escape from the stuff he had in his head. I have no idea where it came from. I am not a psychiatrist. I told him, you are paranoid, and he said, yes, but sometimes paranoids are right" (p. 249, quoting an article from New in Chess #2, 2016).

It is odd to seek explanations for Fischer's pathological Jew-hatred in the behavior of individual Jews such as Reshevsky and the Piatigorskys. No one would deem it acceptable to be a rabidly racist person who hates an entire ethnic group other than Jews based on the alleged misbehavior of individual members of that ethnic group, so it is wrong to in any way suggest that Reshevsky, the Piatigorskys or any other individual Jews are responsible for anything other than their own personal conduct. They did not speak or act on behalf of an entire ethnic group, and it is absurd to even suggest that Fischer's virulent hatred of the Jewish people and, later, the United States--including saying that all Jews should be rounded up and sent to concentration camps, and that the 9/11 attacks were wonderful--has some kind of rational explanation.

Donaldson does not limit his discussion of Fischer's antisemitism to that three page chapter, but the placement of that chapter and the chapter's brevity are perhaps the only discordant notes in an otherwise first rate biography. Since there is no credible evidence that the Reshevsky match shaped Fischer's twisted viewpoints, and since Fischer openly expressed antisemitic views from his early teenage years until his final days it would have made more sense from an organizational standpoint for Donaldson to either not place a brief antisemitism chapter right after the chapter about the match, or else devote a more lengthy chapter to this subject in a completely separate section of the book.

To be clear, Donaldson neither minimizes nor justifies Fischer's antisemitism; he just does not do a great job of explaining why Fischer became antisemitic, because the only real answer is that we do not know and we will never know, unless or until we crack the code of what causes mental illness. The etiology of any one person's mental illness is a mystery in many, if not most, instances.

Regarding the root causes of antisemitism in general, it is fair to state that fear and shame play a significant role. Fischer, a person of Jewish ancestry, repeatedly expressed antisemitic views in public, so it is reasonable to suggest that he felt shame about his own background, and it is evident that--despite his frequent (and, to a great extent, justified) boasts about his abilities--he also had many fears that impacted his life in a negative way.

Shortly after the Reshevsky match, Ralph Ginzburg wrote an article about Fischer for Harper's Magazine. Fischer's biographer Frank Brady referred to the article as "a cruel piece of journalism, a penned mugging, in that it made a vulnerable teenager appear uneducated, homophobic, and misogynistic, none of which was a true portrait" (p. 259, quoting from page 139 of Brady's book Bobby Fischer's Remarkable Rise and Fall--from America's Brightest Prodigy to the Edge of Madness). If you only have a casual awareness of Fischer's career and life but you have heard strange stories about how he thought and behaved as a young man, this article was probably the source of many of those stories. Fischer was outraged by the article, and he denied many of the assertions that Ginzburg made about him. Donaldson says that this traumatic experience profoundly affected Fischer in general, and specifically impacted his future interactions with media members. Donaldson's book includes excerpts from the article, along with his assessment of the article's validity: "Ginzburg's final conclusions were sure to have offended Fischer, and cruel to write about someone so young, but in retrospect, over a half century later, some of them ring true" (p. 258). Fischer was egotistical, he was immature in many ways, and his overall development as a person lagged well behind his development as a great chess player. Donaldson is correct that those are valid points, and he is correct that it was cruel for Ginzburg to write those things about someone who had just turned 18 and was living on his own because his mother had left and his father and his stepfather had long been out of the picture. 

Donaldson notes that even though Ginzburg had not written about chess previously and did not write about chess subsequently he displayed a basic understanding of the game and did not make the technical errors that are so often committed by journalists who know nothing about chess. Donaldson adds that Ginzburg is perhaps best known for serving eight months of a five year prison sentence after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a decision that found Ginzburg guilty of obscenity for his actions in promoting and advertising Eros, a quarterly magazine that he published.

Fischer won the 1962 Stockholm Interzonal by 2.5 points, becoming the first non-Soviet player to win an Interzonal. However, he once again fell short in the Candidates Tournament, finishing a distant 4th place with 14/28, 3.5 points behind Tigran Petrosian, who would subsequently dethrone World Champion Mikhail Botvinnik. Soviet players Paul Keres and Efim Geller tied for =2nd-3rd with 17 points each. The Curacao Candidates Tournament is best remembered for Fischer's accusation--published in Sports Illustrated--that the Soviet players had colluded against him in several ways, most notably by agreeing to short draws with each other (to conserve energy to battle against him), and by discussing moves his opponents could play while his games were still in progress. Fischer asserted that under the current rules it would be impossible for any non-Soviet player to win the World Chess Championship. It is a fact that the top three finishers drew all 12 of their head to head encounters in the Candidates Tournament; after the fall of the Soviet Union, evidence emerged that largely substantiated Fischer's claims--but, at the time, Fischer was often portrayed as a sore loser who was unwilling to accept that he was not the best player in the world. Donaldson correctly points out that--from a mathematical standpoint--a Soviet strategy to draw all head to head games would not have stopped Fischer from winning the tournament had Fischer performed better. However, Donaldson neglects to consider that Fischer's performance was obviously affected by the harsh reality that the eight Candidates were not really eight individual players fighting for top honors but rather a team of five Soviets pitted against the rest of the field with marching orders that they ensure that a Soviet player emerged victorious. Perhaps a chess computer could win the event under those circumstances, but most human beings--particularly an emotionally fragile, if not already paranoid, human being--would find that task difficult, if not impossible. Fischer vowed to never again compete in the World Championship cycle until the rules were changed. During the next cycle (and subsequent cycles), the round robin Candidates Tournament was replaced by a series of one on one matches among the Candidates, which eliminated the collusion problem. 

Despite the rules change, Fischer did not participate in the 1966 World Championship cycle, foreshadowing his future and much longer lasting withdrawal from top level chess. Although people who did not follow chess closely may have been surprised or even stunned by Fischer's refusal to defend his World Championship title in 1975, the reality is that Fischer took extended absences from competition throughout his career; what made his 1975 decision different was that he gave up the World Championship without a fight and he did not compete again for 20 years.

It should be noted that during Fischer's absences from tournament and match play he was still involved in chess in terms of giving simultaneous exhibitions (Donaldson's 1994 book A Legend on the Road is about Fischer's 1964 simul tour), and also by working on various writing projects, including his book My 60 Memorable Games. Donaldson repeats the oft-told story about Fischer at first being reluctant to have that book published because it might reveal too many of his chess secrets, only to relent because he had become convinced that the world was coming to an end soon so he might as well have some spending money for the final days before Armageddon!

After winning the U.S. Championship in each of his first four appearances, Fischer did not play in the 1961 event, but he returned the next year and won four more U.S. Championships in a row. In 1961, Fischer only played in one tournament and one match (versus Reshevsky). He played in four events in 1962. He played in three events in 1963, scoring 25 wins, one draw and no losses with 1st place finishes in the Western Open, the New York State Open, and the U.S. Championship (11-0!).

Fischer did not play in any events in 1964. As noted above, FIDE changed the Candidates round from a tournament to a series of matches as Fischer had requested, but Fischer declined his invitation to play in the 1964 Amsterdam Interzonal.

In 1965, he played in the Capablanca Memorial via teletype (as a U.S. citizen he was not permitted to travel to Havana to play in person). Fischer went to the Marshall Chess Club to play these games. On  January 31, 2019, I visited the Marshall Chess Club, and before I played in that night's tournament I took some pictures of the table used by Fischer when he participated in the Capablanca Memorial:



Fischer won the U.S. Championship in 1965. In 1966, Fischer finished 2nd in the Piatigorsky Cup, he scored 15/17 on Board 1 for Team USA in the Olympiad, and he won the U.S. Championship.

Fischer won two tournaments in 1967. He was in 1st place at the 1967 Sousse Interzonal with an undefeated 8.5/10 score when he withdrew after a dispute about scheduling, giving up the opportunity to compete for the 1969 World Championship. In 1968, he won two relatively small tournaments, and he won one game in the Metropolitan League. In 1969, Fischer did not play in any events, and it was not clear when/if he would play again. 

The Ascent to the Top

In 1970, Fischer surprised observers by not only participating in the U.S.S.R. versus the World match but also by not demanding to play on Board 1 (he won his Board 2 match against former World Champion Tigran Petrosian by scoring two wins and two draws). Fischer won two big tournaments, and he scored 10/13 on Board 1 for Team USA in the Olympiad. He also won perhaps the strongest blitz tournament ever (Herceg Novi), scoring 19/22 to finish 4.5 points ahead of a field that included three former World Champions, former challenger David Bronstein, and future challenger Viktor Korchnoi.

The 1972 World Championship cycle was underway, but Fischer had stopped playing in the U.S. Championship because the organizers did not accept his demand that the event be changed from an 11 round tournament to a 22 round tournament. Fischer argued that lengthening the event made it more likely that the best player would prevail by giving that player an opportunity to overcome a slow start. However, doubling the length of the U.S. Championship would not have been practical at that time because the tournament would have lasted too long--most of the competitors supported themselves with regular jobs--and would have been too expensive to organize. Fischer did not focus on practicality, or what would be convenient for others; he decided that a 22 round robin format is the best way to crown a champion, and he refused to play in a U.S. Championship with any other format. 

Fischer may have had a valid point about how a national championship should be run in an ideal world, but by stubbornly refusing to play he harmed himself without creating the change that he sought. There is no doubt that throughout his career Fischer took some principled stances about playing conditions and prize funds that ultimately improved the status of chess professionals, but there is also no doubt that Fischer's refusal to compromise did not serve his best interests.

The U.S. Championship was a Zonal event, so by not participating Fischer gave up the opportunity to qualify for the 1972 World Championship match. However, after Fischer decided that he wanted to participate in the 1970 Interzonal, Pal Benko graciously gave his spot to Fischer. Thus, Fischer's final ascent to the chess mountaintop began at a time when he was not even the official U.S. Champion. Fischer scored 18.5/23 in the Palma de Mallorca Interzonal, finishing 3.5 points ahead of Bent Larsen, Efim Geller, and Robert Hubner. Not counting the Sousse Interzonal, Fischer had won eight tournaments in a row dating back to 1966.

Fischer's 1970 Interzonal performance was spectacular, but it was just the start of an unprecedented streak. After winning his final seven games in the Interzonal, Fischer defeated Mark Taimanov 6-0 in the first Candidates match and he vanquished Larsen 6-0 in the second Candidates match. Fischer won the first game versus Petrosian in the final Candidates match before Petrosian ended Fischer's winning streak at 20 with a game two victory, but that was just a temporary setback as Fischer won the match 6.5-2.5 to earn the right to challenge Boris Spassky for the World Championship.

The bizarre circumstances of the 1972 Fischer-Spassky match are well documented. Fischer issued many demands pertaining primarily to playing conditions and the prize fund, and at several points it seemed possible that he might not play; remember that he did not participate in the 1966 World Championship cycle, he withdrew from the 1969 World Championship cycle after taking a commanding lead in the Sousse Interzonal, and he was only able to participate in the 1972 World Championship cycle after Benko gave up his spot.

Fischer eventually showed up in Reykjavik to play Spassky. Fischer lost the first game when he could have obtained a draw, and he forfeited the second game when the organizers would not remove television cameras that Fischer claimed were making distracting noises. Spassky agreed to play game three in a small room at the back of the venue, with no cameras and no spectators. Fischer won that game brilliantly, and the remaining games were played in the main playing area. Despite spotting Spassky a 2-0 lead, Fischer won the match 12.5-8.5. One American genius ended 24 years of Soviet dominance of the World Championship.

The Wilderness Years, 1972-92

Fischer's life from 1972-1992 is not enjoyable to contemplate or write about; it is the story of a genius overwhelmed by mental illness to the extent that he was unable to do the one thing that he does at least as well as anyone who has ever lived. I am not a clinician, and even a clinician cannot responsibly diagnose a person without directly examining that person, but in the colloquial, non-clinical sense that reasonably intelligent and compassionate people understand mental illness it is evident that Fischer was mentally ill. 

It is not necessary or helpful to pretend that Fischer was not mentally ill, or that he did not display symptoms prior to winning the World Championship; for example, here are International Master Nikolay Minev's impressions of the 19 year old Fischer (quoted on p. 351 of Donaldson's book; the full interview can be found here)

As a doctor, I will tell you that even at the Olympiad in Varna, in '62, I started to see that something was wrong with him. In the first round, there was a power failure for twenty minutes. Everyone was talking, milling around, going here and there. Bobby took his chair, went to the corner, and with his back to the wall, stayed there for twenty minutes without moving. Clearly scared. This is the first symptom of schizophrenia.

There is no reason to believe that chess in any way caused Fischer's mental illness, and there is good reason to believe that Fischer experienced his greatest moments of clarity when he was most actively engaged with chess. His objectivity about chess positions and chess players is justifiably praised--and that objectivity markedly contrasts with the way that he perceived life outside of the chess board. Perhaps the most pernicious aspect of mental illness is the lack of self-awareness regarding the disease; typically, a person who has a broken leg or some other physical malady does not actively deny the problem, but part of being mentally ill is thinking that the rest of the world is crazy. 

Donaldson cites the aftermath of the publication of Brad Darrach's infamous book Bobby Fischer vs. the Rest of the World as the genesis of Fischer's downfall. Donaldson provides the text of a telegram from Darrach to Fischer in which Darrach promises Fischer that in exchange for Fischer providing Darrach with insider access for several months "I affirm my agreement that I will not use this material for a book or for any magazine article without first obtaining your written approval. Of course, my present series of articles for Life magazine is exempted from the need for this approval" (p. 492). Fischer was outraged when he found out months before the book's publication that Darrach had broken his word and violated Fischer's trust. 

The book's depiction of Fischer is not favorable, to say the least. Is the book accurate? Donaldson concludes, "Opinion varies" (p. 493) and hypothesizes that if the book had not portrayed Fischer so negatively then Fischer may have been willing to overlook the broken promise--a hypothesis that is not consistent with a theme that Donaldson notes throughout his book: Fischer vigorously opposed anyone who tried to make money off of his name and his fame.

Donaldson provides the complete text of a letter that Fischer's then-attorney Paul J. Marshall wrote to Fischer (pp. 493-496). Fischer not only wanted to sue Darrach and a host of other individuals and organizations regarding Darrach's book, but Fischer also wanted to take legal action against Bill Lombardy, his long-time friend who served as his second for at least part of the World Championship match. Lombardy wrote an article about the match for Sports Illustrated, after which Fischer--adhering rigidly to his policy that no one should make money off of him--cut himself off from Lombardy for over 30 years. Several years after the article's publication, when Fischer ran into Lombardy by chance, Donaldson reports an account by eyewitness Lubomir Kavalek that Fischer's only words to his former friend were, "Hi. Do you still write for Sports Illustrated?" followed--after the stunned Lombardy left--by negative comments regarding Lombardy that Kavalek did not consider fit for publication (p. 514). Donaldson writes that at some point after Fischer was released from jail in Japan in 2005 he appreciated Lombardy's support of his plight and resumed his connection with Lombardy.

Marshall's letter painstakingly and compassionately explained to Fischer that there was no legal or ethical basis to sue Lombardy for an article that depicted Fischer positively and that, further, he (Marshall) would not participate in such a course of action after observing how loyal and devoted Lombardy had been to Fischer. Regarding Darrach, Marshall advised Fischer that a lawsuit was not only unlikely to be successful but could also be damaging to Fischer by providing more publicity to the book. Marshall advised that instead of filing a lawsuit he would be willing to work with the publisher's attorney to reach an agreement whereby Fischer would consent to the book's publication in exchange for receiving financial compensation and the removal of certain passages. 

Donaldson's first sentence after Marshall's letter is heartbreaking to anyone who sympathize with Fischer's feelings about Darrach's book but wishes that Fischer had been willing to heed sound counsel: "Per his usual modus operandi Fischer followed none of Marshall's advice" (p. 496). Instead, Fischer represented himself, his lawsuit was dismissed, and he convinced himself that this was yet one more example of the vast, worldwide conspiracy against him that had been percolating in his mind for quite some time.

Donaldson believes that another source of Fischer's post-World Championship suffering is that Fischer had great difficulty dealing with the pressures and burdens of being famous, and he cites examples of how Fischer behaved normally in public situations (such as chess tournaments that he visited as a non-participant) prior to winning the World Championship in contrast to Fischer's apparent discomfort at the heightened attention he received when he made public appearances after winning the World Championship.

There is no question that Fischer was justifiably outraged by Darrach's portrayal of him, and there seems to be evidence that Fischer did not react well to being so famous that he could not visit a chess tournament without being swarmed by well-wishers. However, the symptoms of mental illness that Fischer displayed years before he become World Champion, and the worsening of those symptoms after he became World Champion, cannot be explained away so easily. There may be some truth to Donaldson's opinion about the traumatic effect that the Darrach book and Fischer's fame had on Fischer's state of mind, but there is a simpler explanation for Fischer's deterioration: mental illness is progressive but not necessarily in a linear or predictable fashion; thus, accounts of Fischer behaving "normally" at different places or times do not refute accounts of Fischer's erratic behavior at other places and times. In the book, Donaldson acknowledges this by pointing out that Fischer reacted calmly to a miscommunication about his opponent's transmitted move during the 1965 Capablanca Memorial Tournament but then the next day he had a fit when he was not provided with the orange juice that he had requested for breakfast. 

People who deny or minimize Fischer's mental illness and his bigotry focus on the "good" stories while ignoring or minimizing the "bad" stories, but the full picture is that Fischer, like many mentally ill people, struggled to regulate his thoughts and his actions; he had "good" moments and he had "bad" moments. The documented arc of Fischer's life demonstrates that his illness became worse as he got older. The Ginzburg article, the Darrach book, and the pressure of dealing with fame all may very well have had a negative effect on Fischer--but the underlying mental illness was evident from an early age, prior to any of those situations. 

It is also important to note that at least some of the people who minimize Fischer's mental illness may share his antisemitic beliefs, and thus they believe that he is being persecuted for speaking the truth! It should be emphasized that Donaldson is not in that camp; he recognizes and documents Fischer's paranoid thinking and troubling behavior, though I do not always agree with Donaldson's perspective on when, why, or how those problems began.

Would Fischer Have Beaten Karpov in 1975?

There is a topic of great interest that Donaldson does not address, in keeping with his goal of focusing his book on questions about Fischer that have not already been extensively discussed: What would have happened if Fischer had played against challenger Anatoly Karpov in a World Championship match in 1975?

Karpov received the title by default after Fischer rejected the proposed match terms and refused to play. Garry Kasparov, who won the title after beating Karpov in a 1985 World Championship match and then held off several subsequent match challenges by Karpov, has publicly stated that Karpov would have beaten Fischer, but Kasparov's objectivity cannot be trusted on this issue for at least two reasons: (1) Fischer repeatedly accused Kasparov of cheating and it is fair to say that Kasparov justifiably resents that baseless charge; (2) much of Kasparov's legacy is based on his performance versus Karpov, so elevating Karpov's status inevitably elevates Kasparov's status.

Although it could perhaps be argued that non-Grandmasters do not possess sufficient chess skill to compare world-class players to each other, it is possible to do a fair and objective analysis based on historical information and chess ratings data that require no chess skill to interpret. I would also add that, with a peak USCF rating of 2190 (just 10 points below National Master status), I ranked at or above the 97th percentile of tournament players, so I have at least some capacity to understand and evaluate annotated chess games in addition to my familiarity with chess history and the chess rating system as detailed below; also, because Fischer and Karpov never played each other it is pure speculation regarding what openings the players would choose, whose energy level would be better, whose nerves would be steadier, and what course the middlegames and endgames might have taken. Fischer played openings against Spassky that he had not used before, and he may have prepared novelties for Karpov as well--and Karpov may have prepared novelties for Fischer. So, the ability to do an in depth analysis of Fischer's games and Karpov's games is not sufficient to answer the question of who would have prevailed in a head to head match--and, even if they had played head to head games those games would not provide definitive proof because, like the stock market, past performance does not guarantee future results: Fischer's record versus Spassky prior to their World Championship match was no wins, two draws, and three losses.

Perhaps the best place to start when comparing Fischer and Karpov is to look at the progression of their chess ratings in comparison to the ratings of other elite players. In 1972, Fischer's rating was not only the highest of all-time but it was 125 points higher than the second ranked player. A rating class is 200 points, so he was more than half a class level above the rest of the world! Paul Morphy, who played before the rating system was developed, is probably the only player in recorded history who could legitimately claim to be that much better than everyone else in the world during his era.

Karpov's peak rating never exceeded Fischer's peak rating of 2785 and, more significantly, Karpov never approached the lead that Fischer enjoyed over his contemporaries. Karpov's rating in January 1975 was 2705, significantly lower than Fischer's rating (2780; Fischer's peak rating was so high that he actually lost five points after he won the match versus Spassky). In fact, by the time Karpov reached 2750 (January 1989) he was neither the World Champion nor the world's highest rated player, and it is fair to say that in general the ratings were inflated then compared to the ratings when Fischer played. Karpov achieved the number one ranking with a career-high 2780 rating in July 1994 only after Garry Kasparov (2815) had been removed from the official ratings list because he played a World Championship match versus Nigel Short in defiance of FIDE's regulations. By that time, four other players in addition to Kasparov and Karpov had ratings of at least 2710.

Fischer finished first in the previous eight tournaments that he completed prior to winning the World Championship--and he was leading the 1967 Sousse Interzonal before he withdrew. He won the 1970 Interzonal by 3.5 points. He scored 18.5/21 in the 1971 Candidates matches. He beat Spassky by four points after essentially spotting Spassky the first two games of the World Championship match.

Karpov's record prior to 1975 was much less impressive than Fischer's. Karpov tied with Viktor Korchnoi for first place in the 1973 Leningrad Interzonal, one point ahead of Robert Byrne. Karpov beat Lev Polugaevsky, Boris Spassky, and Viktor Korchnoi by a total score of 25/43 in the 1974 Candidates matches. Of course, the 1974 Candidates Final versus Korchnoi became the de facto World Championship after Fischer refused to play against Karpov. Karpov beat Korchnoi 12.5/24 in 1974, and then Karpov defeated Korchnoi in World Championship matches in 1978 (16.5/32) and 1981 (11/18). 

Perhaps determined to prove that he was a legitimate successor to Fischer, Karpov won many big tournaments during his reign as World Champion. Karpov may be one of the top 10 players of all-time, but he never displayed the dominance that Fischer displayed. Karpov's main rival until the emergence of Kasparov was Korchnoi, a player 20 years older than Karpov. During Korchnoi's prime, he never qualified to play in a World Championship match; it is less likely that he became a stronger player in the 1970s as he entered his 40s than it is that he declined less than the players of his generation declined while at the same time the younger generation did not produce players of quite the same caliber. 

In other words, the evidence suggests that Karpov faced weaker competition than Fischer did; Fischer emerged as the best player in the world battling against Tal, Petrosian, Spassky, Korchnoi, and others during their prime years, while Karpov faced those players when they were past their prime but still better than the younger players. For example, consider the January 1979 FIDE rating list: Karpov ranked first (2705), followed by Korchnoi (2695), Lajos Portisch (2640), Spassky (2640), Jan Timman (2625), Polugaevsky (2625), Larsen (2620), Henrique Mecking (2615), Tal (2615), and Petrosian (2610). At that time, Korchnoi was almost 48 years old, Portisch was almost 42, Spassky was 42, Timman was 27, Polugaevsky was 44, Larsen was 43, Mecking was 27, Tal was 42, and Petrosian was almost 50. Eight years earlier, Fischer decisively beat Spassky in the World Championship match after sweeping Larsen 6-0 and eliminating Petrosian 6.5-2.5. Prior to losing to Fischer, Petrosian had won a close match versus Korchnoi, with one victory and nine draws. Are we supposed to believe that if Fischer had kept playing he would not have been dominating those same players throughout the 1970s the way that he dominated them in 1971-72? Note that the rating difference between number one Karpov and number 10 Petrosian in 1979 was less than the rating difference between number one Fischer and number two Spassky in 1972! Spassky's rating was 2660 in July 1972 and 2640 in January 1979, so even though his reputation is that he became lazy after losing the title his rating was stable for several years after that match.

In January 1980, the teenage Kasparov was already ranked in the top 20, and the top 10 was still filled mostly with the generation that Fischer had dominated: Tal ranked second, Korchnoi ranked third, and Spassky and Petrosian were part of a three way tie for sixth-eighth.

In the pre-chess computer/pre-internet era, elite players were able to extend their careers longer than they do in the current era--now the best players become Grandmasters as teenagers and are considered old when they reach their mid-30s or early 40s--but even taking that into account it is difficult to persuasively argue that Karpov faced stronger opposition than Fischer, at least until Karpov contended with Kasparov. If Fischer had maintained the necessary psychological stability to continue his chess career, it seems likely that he would held on to the title at least until the emergence of Kasparov. 

Although Donaldson does not address how Fischer might have fared against Karpov in 1975, he quotes Grandmaster Duncan Suttles' appraisal of the 49 year old Fischer's potential chances against prime Kasparov in the wake of Fischer's comeback and his match victory versus Spassky in 1992 (p. 592):

I would say Spassky is, maybe, 2650. I don't know how you determine Fischer's performance from that number. It depends on how you count the draws. Not counting draws, maybe 2800...He beat him two to one, didn't he? What does that mean? I would say something between 2750 and 2800. What's Kasparov's rating? About 2780? Let's just say Fischer is within about 25 points of Kasparov--plus or minus.

Suttles added that he would consider Fischer the favorite against top players such as Anand, Ivanchuk, Short, and Timman, and that if "Fischer plays himself back in form" then he would even beat Kasparov. Donaldson notes that some of the sloppiness that critics observed in the second Fischer-Spassky match can be attributed to fatigue caused by how long the games were; due to the unusual time control insisted upon by Fischer, one of the games lasted nine hours! Donaldson also reminds readers that one year after losing the return match against Fischer, Spassky lost a match to Judit Polgar 5.5-4.5, a narrow margin against a top player demonstrating that Spassky was far from just a washed up legend.

I am not sure that the 49 year old Fischer would have beaten the 29 year old Kasparov, but the fact that at least one Grandmaster thinks that this is possible speaks volumes about how prime Fischer would have fared against young Karpov. Suttles' view is perhaps not the majority opinion, but if you read Suttles' complete take (pp. 592-594) then you will see that he makes excellent and credible points about the playing styles of Fischer and Kasparov.

The phrase "built different" is often thrown around now. If there ever was a chess player who was "built different" then Bobby Fischer was that player. His combination of exceptional genius and fanatical work ethic is difficult, if not impossible, to match. Donaldson quotes from an article by Richard Fireman, an amateur player who observed Fischer analyzing with the top U.S. junior players between rounds at the 1969 U.S. Junior Invitational (p. 371):

You'd think we asked for a daffodil and he'd pulled out the Burning Bush, we were so stunned. It wasn't just the sheer speed of his action--though that was certainly impressive enough--but the seeming effortlessness of it, the naturalness which he exhibited; it was as though it were all simple and straightforward and of-course-this-is-what-happens-if-you-don't-do-that, isn't it obvious? That's what was so stunning, as though his mind were a computer, as though anything we could have thought of had already been considered and incorporated and analyzed and dismissed, all in one simple algorithm. As though he were just on a whole other level. I've since met and analyzed with a number of grandmasters, and they weren't even close, so it's not just the difference in playing strength. Sure, they exhibit a natural feel for the game and understanding beyond that of the rest of us mortals, but they're still in the same order of things, the same part of the universe: they fumble around with this idea and that, and they're more likely to come to the right conclusions because of their talent and experience and insight. But they still have to work at it. With Bobby it wasn't like that. With him it was like he had a key to the door containing the mystery, a special pass.

Sadly, we will never know what would have happened if Fischer had played against Karpov in 1975, but the evidence indicates that if Fischer would have shown up in form and completed the match then he would have beaten Karpov.

The Comeback and the Sad Conclusion

Fischer may have lived the rest of his life in obscurity if not for a perfect storm of events that brought him back in the public eye and provided him with the financial resources to support himself. Donaldson quotes in full a 2017 article by Lou Hays in which Hays provides his perspective about why and how Fischer came back in 1992 to play a multi-million dollar match versus Spassky. Hays asserts that Fischer's primary motivation was wanting to have enough money to woo Hungarian chess player Zita Rajcsanyi (who traveled to the United States to spend time with Fischer, although she ultimately did not reciprocate Fischer's romantic interest). Hays states that Fischer had been destitute for quite some time, but Rajcsanyi provided inspiration to Fischer to change his circumstances after he had previously squandered many opportunities to make money. Hays notes that a major self-inflicted problem for Fischer was Fischer's insistence that any person who met with him had to first pay Fischer a fee (which had risen to $5000 by the time that Hays met with Fischer, though Hays writes that Fischer accepted half of that from Hays, in part because Hays provided some chess books to Fischer and Hays also paid a portion of Rajscanyi's airfare to the United States). Hays reports that he told Fischer that no self-respecting businessman would pay a fee to Fischer just to meet him--Hays met Fischer as a fan, not as someone who expected or hoped to profit financially from the meeting--but Fischer stubbornly insisted that every person who met him received a tangible benefit (the status of having met the World Chess Champion) and therefore he was justified to charge each person in advance for that tangible benefit. 

Hays' reflections on his interactions with Fischer provide an interesting glimpse at the thoughts and actions of the often reclusive genius. Hays concludes on a poignant note. Although Fischer's comeback provided millions of dollars to Fischer, the comeback also shined a spotlight on Fischer's paranoia and on Fischer's repugnant opinions about Jews and the United States, and Hays wonders if it would have been better to leave Fischer's legacy as a great champion untainted: "Nowadays, I look back at 1992 with some degree of remorse, seeing the devastation Fischer ultimately brought to his reputation and himself as a human being. It was a grand and exciting adventure, but in view of how Bobby Fischer's life and legacy turned out, if I had the opportunity to do it all over again, I wouldn't." Hays' perspective is understandable, but it is not his place to make such decisions on Fischer's behalf: regardless of how much help Hays or anyone else provided, Fischer deserves most of the credit--or blame--for how his comeback went and for how his life turned out. Fischer chose his path.

Fischer's paranoia and anger both increased after many of his most prized possessions were sold at an auction in 1999. For many years, Fischer had been renting a storage unit in California. After the 1992 match versus Spassky, Fischer could not return to the United States because he faced prosecution for violating federal law (the U.S. sanctions against the former Yugoslavia, where the Fischer-Spassky return match took place), so Fischer sent $5000 per year to Bob Ellsworth to pay the storage unit fees and handle other matters on Fischer's behalf. The storage unit was not rented in Fischer's name, but rather under an assumed name and also under the name of a friend who subsequently moved from California to Texas. When the storage unit company Bekins was bought by a different company, Ellsworth was not aware of the change and the new company had no way to contact Ellsworth, nor any way to know about Fischer's involvement, let alone to contact the reclusive genius. So, when the storage unit fees were not paid, the new company auctioned off the property inside the storage unit. An aghast Ellsworth belatedly found out what was happening, and he spent over $8000 of his own money to buy some of Fischer's property. Ellsworth then brought that property to Fischer, who simply asked Ellsworth where was the rest of his property. Ellsworth had no answers. Fischer was furious, and what he termed the "theft" of his property became a recurring theme in many of his most infamous (and deplorable) radio interviews.

Fischer had every right to be upset about what had happened to his property. However, he failed to take any personal responsibility for (1) his actions that caused him to become a fugitive and (2) his decision to own the storage unit anonymously, which contributed to the series of events that culminated in the auction. There is no question that Ellsworth should have done a better job of staying informed about the storage unit, but there is no evidence of personal animosity by Ellsworth toward Fischer, let alone evidence of Ellsworth's participation in some vast conspiracy against Fischer.

The book concludes with a brief Epilogue mentioning that Fischer did 35 radio interviews between 1999 and 2006, most of which Donaldson terms "painful (or impossible) to listen to when Fischer gets on a roll and expands upon his conspiracy theories with a vengeance." However, Donaldson notes that in those moments when Fischer confined his comments to chess Fischer provided welcome insights. For example, Fischer called Morphy and Capablanca "two of my favorites," while adding that Steinitz "was very great too." Fischer termed Alekhine's style "rather heavy," in contrast to Capablanca, who he described as "much more brilliant and talented, he had a real light touch."

Fischer added, "But the thing that was great about Capablanca was that he really spoke his mind, he said what he believed was true, he said what he felt."

There are virtues and drawbacks to being a person who always speaks his mind and who always says what he feels is true, and Fischer's life eloquently (and, at times, tragically) showcases both those virtues and those drawbacks.

Errata

The book is put together attractively with an easy to read font and its content is fascinating for any chess player, and for anyone who is interested to learn more about genius (and mental illness). However, the book could have benefited from better editing/proofreading. There are so many typographical errors that I will limit myself to just citing the most prominent: in the section titled "Part Five: The Late Sixties" the letter "e" in the word "the" is rendered as an "r" on the top of every single page containing that heading! As a writer whose work has sometimes been mangled by sloppy editing, I can say that this is likely not Donaldson's fault but rather the fault of the editor and/or publisher. There are also some chess notation errors; for example, on page 376 Donaldson describes a game--his own!--that began 1. d4 g6 2. d4; based on the subsequent moves, one of those d4 moves was probably e4. 

Donaldson has mentioned in at least one interview that he is working on a second volume about Fischer, though he did not specify what subject matter and/or time periods would be covered. A second volume would be a great addition to chess literature, and I eagerly anticipate its publication; it would also be great if a second edition of this book is published that corrects the typographical errors.

Further Reading:

Bobby Fischer's Mixed Legacy (January 19, 2008) 

Bobby Fischer Comes Home is a Beautiful Portrait of Genuine Friendship (February 24, 2013)

Dr. Joseph Ponterotto's Psychobiography of Bobby Fischer Provides a Balanced and Sensitive Look at a Tormented Genius (February 27, 2013)   

Thursday, February 11, 2021

"There's a Gleam": Appreciating Marty Schottenheimer

Coach Marty Schottenheimer, who passed away on February 8 at the age of 77, famously told his players, "There's a gleam." He never explained what he meant, yet we all understood: in every life there are moments of hope/moments of opportunity, and we have to make the most of those moments. 

Schottenheimer's first moment of opportunity to be a head coach--after a five year AFL career during which he played linebacker on a championship team as a rookie (1965 Buffalo Bills), and after a decade as an assistant coach--came with the Cleveland Browns in the middle of the 1984 season. He took over a floundering 1-7 squad and led the team to a 4-4 record down the stretch. Next season, the Browns went 8-8, won their first division title since 1980, and took a 21-3 lead in the Divisional Round playoff game versus the defending AFC champion Miami Dolphins before losing 24-21. The start of Schottenheimer's career in Cleveland foreshadowed how the rest of his career would go: Schottenheimer could turn teams around quickly and produce regular season success, but his teams not only usually lost in the playoffs but they often lost in heartbreaking fashion.

That 1985 loss to the favored Dolphins, even after blowing an 18 point lead, felt less like heartbreak at the time and more like the start of something big. The Browns' rookie quarterback Bernie Kosar would soon emerge as one of the league's top passers, and the Browns advanced to the AFC Championship in each of the next two seasons.

Schotteneheimer led the Browns to a 12-4 record in 1986, setting a franchise NFL record for single season wins that still stands (the Browns had three straight seasons with at least 12 wins from 1946-48 in the All-America Football Conference prior to joining the NFL in 1950). The Browns led the Denver Broncos 20-13 at home late in the fourth quarter of the AFC Championship before John Elway orchestrated what will forever be known as "The Drive," a 98 yard march down the field culminating in a five yard touchdown pass to Mark Jackson. The Broncos won in overtime, and advanced to the Super Bowl.

In 1987, the Browns went 10-5 in the strike-shortened season, won the division title, routed the Indianapolis Colts 38-21, and headed to Denver for the AFC Championship with redemption on their minds. Instead, the Browns suffered heartbreak again, as Earnest Byner fumbled just before entering the endzone for what would have been the game-tying touchdown.

The Browns overcame adversity in 1988 to claim a Wild Card berth with a 10-6 record before losing 24-23 to division rival Houston in the Wild Card game. After the season, Schottenheimer and Browns owner Art Modell announced that by mutual consent they had decided that Schottenheimer would not return.

Schottenheimer did not remain unemployed for long. The Kansas City Chiefs hired him prior to the 1989 season. The Chiefs went 8-7-1 that season but then made six straight playoff appearances after making the playoffs just once since 1971. Schottenheimer led the Chiefs to the postseason seven times in 10 seasons--including a pair of 13 win campaigns--but they only advanced to the AFC Championship once. Schottenheimer resigned after the team went 7-9 in 1998, the first losing season in his career. 

He returned to the sideline in 2001 with the Washington Redskins, but despite leading the team to eight wins in the final 11 games after an 0-5 start he was fired by Dan Snyder.

Schottenheimer finished his NFL coaching career in San Diego, where he experienced both the worst regular season of his career (4-12 in 2003) and the best regular season of his career (14-2 in 2006). The Chargers fired Schottenheimer after an internal power struggle following that 14-2 season, and he never coached in the NFL again, though he did win his only professional championship as a head coach in 2012 with the Virginia Destroyers of the United Football League (UFL).

Schottenheimer's Cleveland tenure lasted less than five years at the start of a long and distinguished coaching career, but I will always think of him as a Cleveland Brown. The Browns' run of success under Schottenheimer happened during my adolescence and has not been matched since. That was a fun, if sometimes heartbreaking, time to be a Browns fan. There have been precious few fun times as a Browns fan since that era, and more than 30 years later we Browns fans are still waiting to see back to back playoff appearances (maybe next year!).

Schottenheimer ranks eighth in NFL history in regular season wins (200). The seven coaches ahead of him are either already in the Pro Football Hall of Fame (Don Shula, George Halas, Tom Landry, Curly Lambeau, and Paul Brown) or mortal locks to be inducted as soon as they are eligible (Bill Belichick, Andy Reid).

Hall of Fame coaches who have fewer regular season wins than Schottenheimer include Chuck Noll (193), Bill Parcells (172), Bud Grant (158), Joe Gibbs (154), Steve Owen (153), Bill Cowher (149), Marv Levy (143), Tony Dungy (139), Hank Stram (131), and Weeb Ewbank (130). 

Of course, the Hall of Famers listed above with fewer regular season wins than Schottenheimer each made at least one appearance in the NFL Championship and/or Super Bowl, and--except for Grant and Levy--each won at least one NFL Championship or one Super Bowl. For that matter, each of the coaches ahead of Schottenheimer on the regular season wins list won at least one Super Bowl or NFL Championship, and Reid is the only member of that group who does not have at least two titles.

Schottenheimer ranks just 33rd in playoff wins (5), and he has the worst winning percentage (.278; 5-13 record) among NFL coaches who won at least five playoff games. He has the fourth most playoff losses all-time, but the three coaches who have more losses each had winning records and each won at least one title: Don Shula went 19-17 in the playoffs with two Super Bowl titles, Tom Landry went 20-16 in the playoffs with two Super Bowl titles, and Andy Reid has a 17-15 playoff record with one Super Bowl title.

It is too late for the Hall of Fame to honor Schottenheimer when he could have appreciated it, but there is no rule against posthumous induction. Is he a worthy candidate? If he had won just one Super Bowl he likely would have waltzed into the Hall of Fame a long time ago. Without a championship on his resume, there are lingering questions. Was there something about so-called "Martyball" that was better suited to regular season play than postseason play? Or, did Schottenheimer lift his teams farther than they otherwise would have gone? Is it reasonable to say that he "should" have taken at least one of those teams all the way? 

Schottenheimer's best regular season team, the 14-2 Chargers, lost to the team of the decade--the New England Patriots--in the playoffs. His 1997 Chiefs went 13-3 but lost to the eventual Super Bowl champion Denver Broncos. Schottenheimer's two best Browns teams lost close AFC Championship games to Elway's Broncos. Individually, those losses are understandable, but one could also argue that a Hall of Fame coach should have found a way to not come up short in every single one of those contests. 

There are playoff losses that are less understandable, including when his 1995 Chiefs--a 13-3 squad with home field advantage--lost in the Wild Card game to the 9-7 Indianapolis Colts.  

It is difficult to put Schottenheimer at the absolute top level with the coaches who won multiple titles, including (in chronological order) Paul Brown, Vince Lombardi, Don Shula, Chuck Noll, Tom Landry, Bill Walsh, Jimmy Johnson, and Bill Belichick--but the Hall of Fame has welcomed coaches who won much less often than Schottenheimer did, and several of those coaches did not win titles. The consistent pattern with Schottenheimer--across more than 20 years and four teams--is that his teams became better after his arrival, and got worse after he departed, which suggests that he maximized or at least came reasonably close to maximizing those teams' potential.

Marty Schottenheimer is a Hall of Famer in my book. Rest in peace, Coach Schottenheimer, and thank you for reminding us all to never stop seeking the "gleam."