Placing Tom Brady's Greatness in Historical Context

Tom Brady entered uncharted territory by capturing his seventh Super Bowl title and his fifth Super Bowl MVP after leading the Tampa Bay Buccaneers to a 31-9 victory over the reigning champion Kansas City Chiefs. Brady put up efficient, if not gaudy, numbers, completing 21 of 29 passes for 201 yards, three touchdowns, and no interceptions. He joins Peyton Manning as the only two quarterbacks to win at least one Super Bowl with two different franchises. Brady extended his lead over Charles Haley for most Super Bowls won by a player at any position (Haley won five Super Bowl rings), and he is now three ahead of Terry Bradshaw and Joe Montana among quarterbacks. Bradshaw's standard of four Super Bowl titles seemed daunting when he set it, and Montana was often described as the greatest quarterback of all-time after he matched Bradshaw's record while compiling superior individual statistics.

The Chiefs had won 25 of their previous 27 games, including a 27-24 victory against Tampa Bay this season, but they had no answers for a Buccaneers team that did not lose again after that Kansas City defeat dropped them to 7-5. The Buccaneers won their last four regular season games, they won three road playoff games before becoming the first team to play a Super Bowl in their home stadium, and they became the first team to beat three former Super Bowl MVPs (Drew Brees, Aaron Rodgers, Patrick Mahomes) during one playoff run.

Many analysts considered Brady to be the greatest quarterback of all-time prior to yesterday, and now Brady has added another amazing chapter to his already impressive career. 

The other narrative swirling around Brady involves comparing his legacy to the legacy of Coach Bill Belichick. Belichick and Brady teamed up to win six Super Bowls together--setting the record for a coach-quarterback duo--and media members have often speculated about who was most responsible for the New England Patriots' sustained success. It is not surprising that the media narrative veered in Brady's favor as Tampa Bay advanced through the 2020 playoffs while the Patriots failed to qualify for postseason play. Tampa Bay's victory closes the book on this narrative for many media members, who now gleefully proclaim that Brady had more to do with New England's success than Belichick did.

Narratives are easy to construct, and they are often based more on emotion and selective recall/understanding of history than on objective reality.

For example, a popular narrative ranks LeBron James as the greatest basketball player of all-time, but objective analysis reveals that this assertion overlooks the accomplishments of not only some of James' predecessors but even those of his contemporaries, including Kobe Bryant. After James won his fourth NBA title and fourth NBA Finals MVP last season, the narrative uplifting James became even more prominent, but based on MVPs and championships won (two of the criteria often used to support elevating James), James has not surpassed Bill Russell, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, or Michael Jordan.

There is no doubt that James belongs in the greatest basketball player of all-time conversation, just as there is no doubt that Brady belongs in the greatest quarterback of all-time conversation, but the reality is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to objectively select one individual as the greatest performer in a team sport; even in an individual sport such as tennis there is not a clear choice, though that sport also has a media-driven narrative favoring one person (Roger Federer).

Championships won is the simple number often cited to buttress popular narratives, but it is interesting to see which championships "count" when narratives are told. It has become common practice to suggest that Michael Jordan holds some kind of record with six NBA titles, because that is often depicted as the number that Kobe Bryant was chasing (Bryant finished his career with five titles), and it is often depicted as the number LeBron James is chasing now--but Bill Russell won 11 NBA titles in 13 seasons, in addition to leading his teams to two NCAA titles plus an Olympic gold medal. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar won six NBA titles but for some reason his titles do not "count" when basketball greatness is being discussed. 

Similarly, much was made of Roger Federer's Grand Slam singles titles, but the talk of the significance of Grand Slam titles became much quieter after Rafael Nadal tied Federer with 20. Narrative creators feel free to change the stories and change the rules as opposed to changing the narrative: once Roger Federer or Tom Brady or LeBron James becomes the favored son, it takes a lot to convince media members to anoint someone else.

There is no disputing the greatness of Federer or James or Brady. Brady has not only won more Super Bowls (seven wins in 10 appearances) than any other player, but he has more Super Bowl wins than any other franchise! He would likely make the Hall of Fame just on the basis of what he has accomplished since the age of 37, including three Super Bowl wins plus earning a regular season MVP award. In that sense, he is similar to Abdul-Jabbar, whose accomplishments past the age of 35 (four NBA titles, one NBA Finals MVP, four All-NBA First Team selections, and eight All-Star selections) exceed what many Hall of Famers accomplished during their entire careers.

However, if championships are the touchstone and measuring stick of professional football greatness in general and/or the greatness of a quarterback in particular, then it must be remembered that Otto Graham made 10 championship game appearances in 10 professional seasons, leading the Cleveland Browns to seven titles. He went four for four in his All-America Football Conference championship game appearances, and then he followed that by winning three titles in six NFL seasons, including leading the Browns to a 30-28 win over the favored L.A. Rams in the 1950 NFL championship game. Against the Rams, Graham completed 22 of 33 passes for 298 yards, four touchdowns, and one interception, while also running 12 times for 99 yards. That victory happened in the first season after the NFL and AAFC merged, and it demonstrated that the Browns' AAFC titles deserved full recognition. 

It is not at all clear why NFL titles are not given equal weight with Super Bowl titles; an NFL championship is an NFL championship, regardless of what it was called in 1950 or what it is called now. AAFC titles should "count" just as much as AFL titles and pre-Super Bowl NFL titles. 

If the argument against doing so is that the rules and style of play were vastly different during Otto Graham's time and Bill Russell's time than they are in Tom Brady's time and LeBron James' time then the correct response is not to discount or ignore Graham and Russell but rather to candidly acknowledge the difficulty of making intergenerational comparisons. Perhaps there is no such thing as "the" greatest player of all-time. Maybe Graham was the greatest of his time, and now Brady is the greatest of his time (which is not to discount the possibility that other players from either era deserve consideration). 

The greatest quarterback of all-time narrative favored John Unitas for quite some time (and there is no doubt a vocal minority of observers who would still rank Unitas as the best). Unitas set career records for passing yards (40,239) and touchdowns (290) that far exceeded the marks that he broke. He won two NFL titles in the pre-Super Bowl era, plus an NFL title in the Super Bowl era (but that season ended in a famous loss to the AFL champion New York Jets in Super Bowl III). Unitas threw a touchdown in Super Bowl V before leaving the game due to injury, and his Colts won that contest on a last second field goal after Unitas' backup Earl Morrall replaced Unitas. Unitas is considered the prototype drop back passer.

It is interesting that the player who broke Unitas' records, Fran Tarkenton, was not often mentioned as the greatest quarterback of all-time; I cannot recall ever seeing or hearing a commentator rank Tarkenton as the best. Yet, Tarkenton held the career passing yardage record (47,003) for longer than any other quarterback (19 years), and he also held the career passing touchdowns record (342) for longer than any other quarterback (20 years), but Tarkenton never won a Super Bowl.

Terry Bradshaw won four Super Bowls, but his individual numbers are not as gaudy as Unitas' or Tarkenton's, nor are they efficient when compared to the statistics compiled by the passers who came after him and who benefited from rules changes that opened up the passing game.

Dan Marino at one time held the career records for passing yardage and for touchdowns, but he only made it to one Super Bowl and he never won a championship. Early in his career he was touted as someone who could become the greatest quarterback ever, but as Marino set records while Montana won Super Bowls the notion that Marino might be the greatest faded from consideration, and Marino became the Tarkenton of his era (albeit with a much different playing style, as Tarkenton was a scrambler while Marino was a pure pocket passer).

Joe Montana matched Bradshaw by winning four Super Bowls, and by the end of his career he was often touted as the greatest quarterback of all-time, a notion that went largely unchallenged until the emergence of Brady.

At some point after Brady matched Montana and Bradshaw with four Super Bowl wins while also accumulating MVP awards and posting gaudy statistics, the narrative shifted from Montana to Brady. Brett Favre--who held the career passing touchdowns record for seven years--and Peyton Manning--who held the career passing touchdowns record for five years--received some consideration prior to Brady's ascension, but Favre only won one Super Bowl and Manning only won two Super Bowls so after Brady surpassed their individual records his superior ring count took both of them out of the conversation. 

Drew Brees and Tom Brady have been trading the career passing touchdowns record recently, but Brees won just one Super Bowl, and he did not win that Super Bowl until after Brady had already been ranked ahead of Favre and Manning, so Brees has never been part of the greatest quarterback of all-time narrative.

If you believe that quarterback is the most important position in football--if not in all team sports--and if you believe that a quarterback's greatness is best measured by championships, then your choices are Otto Graham or Tom Brady. If you place more value on individual numbers, then you have to decide if it matters more to dominate your own era by a wide margin--in which case, you would probably choose Unitas--or if it matters more to dominate in recent times, in which case you could choose any one of several quarterbacks depending on which statistics you deem to be the best measure of greatness.

The larger point is that, without clearly defining the standard of greatness, the narrative elevating Brady (or anyone else) is so devoid of context as to be rendered meaningless. Was it more difficult to play in earlier eras under different rules and conditions, or are today's athletes so superior to the athletes from decades past that the athletes from previous eras would not excel today? 

Most commentators and analysts do not embrace the challenge of researching such matters and using that research as a basis to form intelligent opinions; instead, we are fed simplistic narratives about "rings" and "Who is the GOAT?" that do a disservice to the history of the game and the accomplishments of the game's greatest players.

Regarding the Belichick and Brady narrative, it is not necessary or accurate to diminish what Belichick achieved in order to give Brady the praise that he deserves. Bill Belichick's Super Bowl XX game plan as the New York Giants' defensive coordinator was so brilliant that it is on display at the Pro Football Hall of Fame. Belichick's offensive and defensive game plans as the Patriots' head coach are indisputably great, and those schemes played a crucial role in the franchise's unparalleled success.

It is fascinating to watch how the media creates and manipulates narratives. Brady is almost universally popular, with perhaps the only exception being the fans of teams who he has beaten in Super Bowls--but Belichick is regularly mocked for his press conference demeanor. Many media members would love to bring Belichick down a notch--or six notches, by finding any excuse to discount his Super Bowl titles. Of course, the same narrative game that they are now playing with Belichick and Brady could easily be applied to Belichick and Bill Parcells--and there would be more substance to the latter, as Belichick and Parcells are both coaches and have actually gone head to head against each other in that role.

Parcells won two Super Bowl titles as a head coach, with Belichick running the defense for both squads. Parcells has never won a playoff game--let alone a Super Bowl--without having Belichick on his staff. In fact, Parcells has a losing record overall without Belichick by his side. Parcells supposedly taught Belichick how to win, which is a difficult notion to accept when you look at the won-loss records of both coaches. 

After Belichick left the New York Giants, he took over a horrible Cleveland Browns team (3-13 in 1990) and led the Browns to the playoffs in 1994. That Browns team, which went 11-5, defeated Parcells' New England Patriots in the playoffs, which was the Browns' last playoff win until this season's squad beat the Pittsburgh Steelers. There is some history and context that can be referenced to defend Parcells, but a head to head comparison of coaches who competed with and against each other over an extended period of time makes more sense than trying to define the careers of a coach and a quarterback based on their one season apart after they forged a two decade partnership filled with unequaled success.

Of course, Bill Parcells is beloved as "The Big Tuna." The media is not going to construct a narrative that elevates Belichick over Parcells.

One of the many problems with comparing a football coach's impact with a quarterback's impact is that the coach directs how the entire team plays, while the quarterback's impact is strictly limited to offense, which is less than half of the game (if you factor in that many plays involve neither offense nor defense but rather special teams). 

As a brief side note, it is a true exercise in folly to compare Tom Brady to LeBron James. A star basketball player participates in most of the game (usually at least 38-40 out of 48 minutes) and he has an impact on both offense and defense as one of five teammates on the court, while a quarterback is one of 11 teammates on the field, and his impact is restricted to offense.

Brady's impact on a team is undeniable. He is a great and charismatic leader. His quarterback skill set is impeccable. 

All of that being said and acknowledged, the notion that there is some valid way to parse out Brady's impact on the Patriots from Belichick's impact on the Patriots is absurd. You may counter, "But what if Belichick never makes the playoffs again?" Belichick is 68 years old, and he already is one of the oldest coaches to win a Super Bowl. He is undoubtedly past his prime, and he is closer to the end of his coaching career than he is to the beginning. Do you judge Chuck Noll, Tom Landry, and Don Shula by what they did in the last 5-10 years of their coaching careers, or do you judge them by their overall body of work, with a focus on their primes? 

What if Belichick grooms a young quarterback and wins one more Super Bowl before retiring? That would add to Belichick's legacy, just like yesterday's Super Bowl win added to Brady's legacy, but that would not tell us whether Belichick or Brady had more to do with the Patriots' success.

The truth is that we will never know, but that honest narrative will not move the ratings needle or generate clicks for online articles, so brace yourself for all of the "Brady Owns Belichick" stories.

It is interesting to watch the Patrick Mahomes narrative evolve in the midst of these other narratives. Mahomes has already led the Chiefs to back to back Super Bowl appearances, and one Super Bowl title. It is logical to assume that he will have many more opportunities, but--as noted above--Dan Marino made one Super Bowl appearance early in his career and then never made it back, and Brett Favre made two Super Bowl appearances (with one win) in his 20 year career. It cannot be emphasized enough that the quarterback is a very important player, but he does not play on defense or special teams, and he is rendered helpless if his teammates are ineffective--just look at what happened to Mahomes in Super Bowl LV when the Buccaneers' defense overwhelmed Kansas City's offensive line. 

The truth is that the Mahomes story is incomplete. If he finishes his career with one Super Bowl win plus some gaudy individual numbers then he will not merit being ranked alongside the absolute greatest. On the other hand, yesterday's loss does not diminish what he has already accomplished, and to suggest otherwise is as incorrect as suggesting that Brady's win somehow diminishes what Belichick has already accomplished.

What can we determine using a reasonable, objective approach? 

1) There is a strong argument that Tom Brady is the greatest quarterback of his time. He may be the greatest quarterback of all-time, but to make that assessment we must first decide how to validly compare statistics and team accomplishments from the 1940s-1990s with statistics and team accomplishments from 2000-present (Brady's era).

2) There is a strong argument that Bill Belichick is the greatest NFL coach of his time. He may be the greatest NFL coach of all-time, but to make that assessment we must first decide how to validly compare statistics and team accomplishments from prior eras to the statistics and team accomplishments from Belichick's era (1980s-present).

3) Under Bill Belichick's guidance, Tom Brady developed from being a sixth round draft pick into being arguably the greatest quarterback of his time, and possibly the greatest quarterback of all-time. We do not have a large enough sample size of data to determine what development path Brady would have followed without Belichick's influence. 

4) With Tom Brady as his starting quarterback, Bill Belichick has won six Super Bowls as a head coach. During that time, Belichick played a role in both player development and game plan creation. Prior to that time, in his first stint as a head coach, Belichick built the Cleveland Browns from a last place team into a playoff team; prior to coaching the Browns, Belichick's defensive game plans played a major, if not decisive, role as the New York Giants won two Super Bowls. We have a large enough sample size of data to determine that Belichick is an outstanding, versatile coach even without Brady. We do not have a large enough sample size of data to prove how many Super Bowls that Belichick's Patriots would have won without Brady.

The bottom line is that winning a championship involves many variables that cannot be controlled by either the coach or the quarterback. If the Buccaneers had not been able to shut down Patrick Mahomes, resulting in Kansas City winning a 34-31 shootout with Brady posting exactly the same numbers that he posted yesterday would that somehow diminish Brady's greatness? Would it increase Belichick's greatness by "proving" that Brady cannot win a Super Bowl without Belichick?

Framing the conversation in those terms, it should be obvious that many of the media-driven narratives are nonsense.

Exploring Modes of Thought as Described in Gerald Abrahams "The Chess Mind"

Gerald Abrahams' The Chess Mind is a fascinating and thorough examination of the general workings of the mind and also of the specific workings of a chess player's mind. Abrahams was a barrister by profession who never became a Grandmaster, but he was a very strong player who twice finished third in the British Championship. Three-time British Champion Harry Golombek said that during the 1930s Abrahams "was the most dangerous attacking player in England."

In the Introduction to The Chess Mind, Abrahams makes a lengthy, lucid and persuasive case for the importance of the Chess Mind. Here is an excerpt (pp. 9-10):

The Chess Mind is an important Mind, and important to more than chess players. In Chess, human intelligence achieves a creativity which cannot be explained away in terms of conditioned reflexes or the formation of habits. One of the Author's contentions in this essay is that mental habits and memory are elements in the Chess mind as a knowledge of language is part of the equipment of an orator, or as a technique is essential to the musician. Beyond that equipment training ends, and the mind creates from its own resources and material. What a good Chess player does is comparable, as a mental act, to what the inventor does, be he scientist or poet; an act of free imagination, which changes its own surroundings by the revelation of latent possibilities...

That mind achieves this freedom, and this creativity, is then a datum, and perhaps the only datum, which gives scientific substance to the philosophical traditions of a liberal society. A belief in this--the reality of the mind--is the principle which distinguishes a liberal society, even in its decadence, from the considerable--and successful--forms of slavery to which deterministic thinkers can reconcile themselves. Indeed, freedom of mind, that slight degree of independence and control, which so easily loses scope and reality under the pressure of economic difficulties or political powers, is the only luxury that is lacking in a regimented society, where all predictable behaviour is harnessed to economic effort or military struggle. If those theorists are right who say that this mental freedom is an illusion, in a reality that offers no leisure for dreaming, then there was no ultimate value to justify the world conflict of Democracy against a regimented and brutal Fascism. It is the Author's belief, however, that those mental activities (whatever their limitations of scope) in which the mind experiences freedom, are more than a trivial skill at games and more than the luxuries of the effete. Free society--nay, any society--relies on free unmalicious thought, as masses of human beings rely on the skill of the builders, engineers and aviators to whom they trust their lives. Not all Chess players will deduce from this their own social importance, because not all intellectuals are conscious of responsibility, or even intelligent. But those who do think about themselves and the world objectively may realize that the refinements of thought, the delicate tentacles of mentality, are the slender threads from which depend the hanging gardens of modern civilization.

The book is divided into two parts. Part One is titled "Varieties of Mental Activity in Chess," and it consists of eight chapters describing different types of chess thinking. Part Two is titled "The Chess Mind in Action," and it includes 48 lightly annotated chess games, most of which were played by World Champions or contenders for the World Championship.

Early in Part One, Abrahams provides a great explanation of the similarities between the general thought process of an intellectual and the specific thought process of an exceptional chess player (pp. 19-20):

Just as the minds of intellectuals are so developed, in particular fields or generally, that even a succinct reference--a phrase like inflation or entropy, for example--is sufficient to enable them to apprehend the reality of a complex process, so the good Chess player, glancing at significant points, can assess the tactical and strategical possibilities of a difficult position with relative ease. Among, and rising above, these educated minds are those who, while reading, are not only understanding, but criticizing, agreeing or disagreeing, or, better than that, reconstructing, and improving upon, the thoughts that they are absorbing with ideas of their own--ideas that perhaps the writers of what they are reading have not grasped. These are the men of constructive imagination--by which is meant more than wit, and more than fancy, more than cunning or any narrow cleverness; and they correspond to the Chess players of imagination, who see the position whole, and see into possibilities that the ordinary experience of even an able player would not be sufficient to suggest. These are creative in a degree above the average of intellectuals. They discover and invent ideas: which is more than to understand argument, or translate from recondite languages.

Abrahams is perceptively outlining differences not just in levels of thinking ability--levels of minds--but categorical differences in kinds of thinking--kinds of minds. Bobby Fischer was not just better at chess than other Grandmasters--his mind functioned differently in the way it perceived, combined, and organized ideas. The same is true of geniuses in other realms of thought. A genius is not just a more capable or faster thinker than a regular person--a genius thinks differently in a qualitative sense. You can train to improve proficiency; you cannot train to achieve genius level.

Abrahams disagrees with the notion that chess is inherently mathematical in nature. He compares the work of a mathematician to "carrying out operations with the aid of formulae. He is, as it were, putting something into a machine and turning a handle" (p. 28). In contrast, Abrahams asserts that a chess player is "comparable to the user of a language with a grammar rather than to those who explicitly use rules and formulae deductively" (p. 27). Chess rules provide a framework within which moves must be chosen, but the chess rules do not determine what that move must be; a mathematical equation has but one answer, while the possibilities of language and chess are much more flexible and expansive.

Writing in 1951, Abrahams was understandably skeptical that a machine could ever be programmed to play chess at anything beyond a most rudimentary level--but, at that time, Abrahams had no way to know not only how much computing power would increase in the subsequent decades but also that we would develop computers using neural networks (such as Alpha Zero) that can outplay even the World Champion. The creation of computers that play chess at such a tremendous level expands the possibilities of what machines can do beyond what Abrahams anticipated, but it does not disprove Abrahams' concept of how human chess players think. He was right that humans think about chess in a way that does not consist of rote applications of formulae, but he was wrong to assume that processes could not be developed to enable machines to produce superior results by alternative means.

When deciding upon a course of action, a good chess player must not rely only on "common sense"--moves that superficially look good or appear to achieve a specific strategic or tactical goal--but must also be prepared to deeply examine each position for paradoxical ideas lurking beneath the surface; a move may be logical in a general sense but be incorrect because of a specific idea that refutes that move. Such paradoxical ideas can elude the awareness of even a strong player in a given position if that player is not focused on what makes that position unique, as opposed to the general pattern of typical play that superficially seems to apply to the situation at hand.

Thus, playing chess well requires not just familiarity with what could be called the language and grammar of chess, and not just the ability to unearth and understand paradoxical yet correct ideas, but also a special kind of imagination. Abrahams writes that imagination "is the capacity of the mind for construction and clarity" and states that "this is of the essence in chess" (p. 52), but he notes that when many people speak of imagination they mean "a capacity for the apprehension of the not-obvious, of the particularly not-obvious, of the 'clever'" (p. 52). Abrahams observes that imagination of this sort can be of the "greatest importance" to a chess player but "can also be dangerous to its possessor" (p. 52) because an idea "may be interesting yet is not to be entertained as a possibility" (p. 52). In other words, the best kind of chess imagination is able to conceive of novel solutions to difficult problems while also being tethered to the realistic limitations of the situation on the board; imagination backfires in chess when it produces an unusual solution that turns out to permit a subtle but effective retort by the opponent.

The ability to precisely analyze tactics is essential for a chess player. Often, this involves sacrificing material. Even beginning chess players are familiar with the chart showing the relative point values of each chess unit, but the operative word here--the word misunderstood, if not ignored, by weak chess players--is "relative." Yes, a Queen's relative value is nine points while a Rook's relative value is five points, but if you can give up your Queen for a Rook to force checkmate then the relative values of those pieces are not as important as the absolute value of winning the game. Of course, many sacrifices do not lead to such a clear outcome--at least not in the short run--so the ability to not only calculate but also evaluate is critically important. Abrahams writes, "All that sacrifice signifies is that the player sees through the superficial values of the pieces to their functions. But these functions must be exactly and precisely followed. The player who bombards and tears his opponent's position open, regardless of the cannon fodder expended, is playing an inexact type of positional Chess, and not really combining. On the other hand, failing to combine when necessary is one instance of failure to analyze clearly" (p. 76).

Abrahams declares that chess is fundamentally "the clash of mind against mind. The creativity of the mind, actualized in the Chess struggle, is the factor ignored by those who are tempted to think that there is an objective strategy that enables players to avoid combinative disaster. Strategy, we shall see, exists, and is important; but the hard core of the game is tactical threat. Moreover, good Chess has to be played even in good positions" (p. 81). As Siegbert Tarrasch said, "It is not enough to be a good player; you must also play well."

Most chess players have often had the unpleasant experience of losing from a winning position. Abrahams writes (pp. 83-85):

Chess, it must be remembered, is combat. When the position appears static and solid, ideas, being appreciated, may reveal a breach.

When the battle is at its height, cleverness rather than logic is essential to avoid dangers as well as to exploit weaknesses.

And when the battle appears to be won, then mental effort is as necessary as ever. That the winning of won games can be harder than the gaining of the winning position is a truth only too well known to the majority of good players.

In the chapter titled "General Thinking,"Abrahams clarifies that it is true that there is a distinction between strategy and tactics but false--or, at the very least, inadequate--to assume that strategy and tactics can be considered entirely separate; a chess player who cannot think well strategically is lost at sea, while a chess player who cannot think well tactically may have a general concept of where he is trying to go, but he (or, at least, his King) is likely to be ambushed and killed before he gets there. He writes, "An appreciation of general factors gives confidence, gives a certain guidance to thoughts of attack and defense, but is never a substitute for the detailed treatment of the empirical problems of the game" (p. 105).

Chess is played by millions of people, but it is truly understood by only a select few. Abrahams notes that even those who are paid to cover the game often do not understand it very well (p. 135).

Chess reporters are usually wrong in their selection of diagrams. They choose the position in which the spectacular move was made. The spectacular move usually possesses only an aesthetic merit which is irrelevant to Chess, because it is for the spectator only--but the real merit and the real beauty usually lies in the moves that depend for their validity upon the eventual spectacular move. These, if an aesthetic attitude be adopted, are the moves that matter. Conversely, moves can be beautiful which depend on clever variations that are never actualized. If search be made in the scores of master Chess it will be found that many of the best melodies are unheard.

Great chess players combine tactical awareness with strategic judgment, but they also tend to display a preference for a particular style and/or certain kinds of positions. At lower levels, though, tactics assume a greater degree of importance; a devastating tactical shot can end a game immediately, like a boxer's knockout punch, and lower players are more apt to stumble into an opponent's haymaker than higher level players who both play more soundly from a positional sense and who are also more keenly aware of tactical possibilities. Precisely because great players have more tactical awareness the tactics in their games often are relegated to being unheard melodies.

Although it may not be obvious while watching amateurs play, the draw margin in chess is high: you have to make a serious mistake (or several smaller mistakes) to lose a chess game, which is why so many top level games are drawn. Abrahams declares, "When we find games that are won by the exploitation of infinitesimal advantages, then we are witnessing a manifestation of genius" (p. 172).

Abrahams correctly observes (p. 175) that at the highest levels "courage and caution," "energy and inertia," and "very great will-power" are essential for success. The ability to see many moves ahead and the ability to calculate accurately are important but not sufficient, because no one can see everything or calculate everything. Thus, the player's character, conditioning--mental, emotional, and physical--and temperament often determine the outcome of a game, a match, a tournament--and a career, for that matter. In this way, chess is a microcosm of life--it is not possible to see all futures or calculate all possible outcomes, so each of us chooses a path based on our character, our conditioning, and our temperament. Abrahams singles out will-power as the most important of these factors, asserting that lack of will-power can hold back a talented player while players who have great will-power often achieve more than might be expected when considering their apparent talent.

Abrahams notes that in chess luck only plays a role in terms of whether you receive the white or black pieces against a given player, or whether you face a particular player early in the tournament or late in the tournament (which can have implications not only in terms of fatigue, but also in terms of how peacefully inclined one or both players may be in light of the overall tournament standings). Within the confines of the 64 squares, luck does not exist: you control your forces, and you decide your fate.

Eugene Znosko-Borovsky famously asserted "Chess is a game of understanding and not of memory." Abrahams concurs, and he goes to some lengths to explain why a good memory may be helpful to a strong chess player but is far from essential. Abrahams defines three different kinds of memory (pp. 191-192):

The student should appreciate here that there is ambiguity in the word memory. The word is used to cover that full awareness of the present and immediate past which is essential to any complete vision. 'Memory' is also used to describe the recollection of the more distant past, after the mind has invoked its machinery of forgetting and recalling.

And there is a third meaning--very difficult to state exactly at the present stage of our knowledge of the physical constitution of the mind. That is the memory which is our knowledge of the meaning of words--the Chess player's knowledge of the moves of the pieces and of methods of play. These are remembered in the sense that they become habits of the mind.

Abrahams suggests that a chess player who has memorized a lot but understood little is similar to a person who has memorized works of literature without comprehending what those works mean; the latter may be able to recite such works, but he will not be able to write well, and similarly a chess player who has memorized move sequences or even entire games will not play well if that player lacks the ability to calculate tactics and understand strategic considerations.

However, it seems that most of the greatest players of all-time are gifted with fantastic, if not photographic, memories--including, but not limited to, World Champions Fischer, Kasparov, and Carlsen--so I suspect that there is a limit to how far one can go in chess without possessing at least a very good memory. Abrahams asserts that the best players are able to figure things out during a game using their imagination and understanding, but perhaps Abrahams is oversimplifying to prove his point, or perhaps this is a matter of semantics in terms of how to define memory: no great player is figuring out everything during a game as events happen, and every strong player I have ever met or learned about is equipped with basic knowledge/memory/recall of certain positions/structures (which, to be fair to Abrahams' evaluation of the role memory plays in chess, seems to fall into the third category of memory that Abrahams describes as "habits of the mind").

In an overly broad sense, it could be argued that anything that a person understands is to some extent a function of memory; taken to the extreme, if you cannot remember anything then how could you understand anything? It is not realistic to believe that someone who has poor recall can repeatedly figure out complicated things from scratch. No, a photographic memory is not required to be World Champion or even to be an Expert or a Master, but a strong memory is an asset for a chess player.

Abrahams presents some examples of memory without understanding leading players astray, including some Masters who trusted published analysis without verifying it and then lost in ignominious fashion--but here the fault lies not with memory but rather with judgment (or laziness): if the Master had checked the analysis before playing the moves and found that the analysis is flawed then he could have used his memory to good effect and remembered during the game to play something that works!

Abrahams' larger point about the importance of understanding compared to rote memorization is valid, though, and he perceptively describes the higher order memory that all strong chess players utilize. He writes (pp. 200-201):

But more important than the consciously recollected is that set of mental habits which smooths the action of the mind. This is the third kind of memory mentioned above--the memory which is a scholar's knowledge of a language; the equipment which enables him to use it without conscious effort.

In Chess, and in many sciences, one aspect of this kind of memory is Technique.

Technique is something difficult to define, existing as it does between objective vision and recollection of method. It is the more difficult to define because method itself is hard to describe in a game of Chess, where one sees, or does not see, a process by an intuitive act.

But just as the musician has methods of play which are consistent with objective reading of the score, so the Chess player has methods of carrying out particular tactical operations, like forcing a Pawn to the back row, which he does not require to think about when contemplating an approaching ending.

I would argue that it takes a good memory to cultivate the myriad "mental habits" necessary to play elite level chess. I watched a young Hikaru Nakamura almost instantly figure out an intricate endgame during an analysis session after a pair of quite strong players had spent a lot time without reaching a conclusion about the best play for both sides. Was this a feat of memory by Nakamura--specifically recalling something he had seen before--or was it a demonstration of his superior understanding? Even if one suggests that it was the latter and not the former, without a superb memory how would Nakamura call to mind so quickly the understanding of chess that he had cultivated? Semantics aside, some form of memory is at work here, and the majority of people who do not possess such memory will find it difficult, if not impossible, to attain Nakamura's level of chess understanding. The saying "game recognizes game" comes to mind, and I can speak from personal experience here in at least two realms: when you step on a basketball court, it does not take long to figure out if some of the players are just more gifted--physically and/or from a skill set standpoint--than others, and when you play chess against someone or analyze chess with someone it does not take long to figure out if that person is remembering more and/or understanding more than you are. I have experienced both sides of that situation in both realms. To deny the existence of inherent talent or to deny the importance of superior memory does not change the reality of talent or the importance of memory.

Throughout the book, Abrahams illustrates and illuminates his points with examples selected both from his games and from the games of elite Grandmasters, including World Champions Steinitz, Lasker, Capablanca, Alekhine, and Botvinnik. The Chess Mind was first published in 1951, with a subsequent edition appearing in 1960. The games section in the 1975 paperback edition (the version under review here) includes several post-1951 games, but--oddly--only one game by Bobby Fischer: his sparkling 1956 victory at the age of 13 over Donald Byrne, a prodigious work of art later dubbed "The Game of the Century."

Reading The Chess Mind will not only stimulate your thinking about the process of thinking while helping you become a better chess player, but it will enhance your appreciation of the beauty of chess, and remind you about--or, as the case may be, introduce you to--some of the most wonderful games played by some of the greatest chess players of all-time.

Authentic Home Run King Hank Aaron Passes Away

Hank Aaron, who is baseball's authentic all-time home run king despite what MLB's fraudulent record book says, has passed away at the age of 86. Aaron blasted 756 home runs during his 23 season career, breaking the record of 714 that had long been held by Babe Ruth. Aaron received a lot of racist hate mail as he approached Ruth's record, but Aaron's quiet, firm dignity never wavered. He began his MLB career shortly after Jackie Robinson integrated the sport, and he joined Robinson in not only overcoming racist obstacles placed in his path but also establishing himself as one of the greatest players of all-time. 

In addition to being the authentic home run champion, Aaron holds the official MLB career records for RBIs (2297), total bases (6856), and extra-base hits (1477). He ranks third in career hits (3771), third in career games played (3298), and fourth in career runs scored (2174).

Aaron won the National League MVP in 1957, the same year he led the Milwaukee Braves to a World Series title. He holds the MLB record for most seasons on an All-Star roster (21) and most All-Star Game selections (25); MLB played two All-Star Games during some years, so Aaron actually has more All-Star Game selections than career seasons played, and the only seasons during which he was not selected as an All-Star were his first (1954) and his last (1976). Aaron, a career .305 hitter, won two NL batting titles (1956, 1959), and he ranked in the top five in batting average 11 times.

Although Aaron never had a 50 home run season, he belted at least 40 home runs in eight different campaigns, tied for the second most such seasons all-time behind only Babe Ruth (11). Aaron led the NL in home runs four times (1957, 1963, 1966-67). Remarkably, in addition to his prodigious power hitting he also ranked in the NL's top ten in stolen bases eight times, including second in 1963 with a career high 31. Although he is not primarily known for defense, he earned three Gold Gloves (1958-60).

Aaron was not only consistently productive, but he was remarkably durable, playing in at least 150 games in 14 different seasons. He spent most of his career with the Braves franchise, first in Milwaukee (1954-1965) and then with Atlanta (1966-74), before returning to Milwaukee to spend two years in the American League as a designated hitter for the Brewers.

The biggest sports stars of the 1970s--including Julius Erving, Pete Maravich, Bjorn Borg, Mario Andretti, and Muhammad Ali--will always hold a special place in my heart, and Aaron is inextricably linked to the 1970s, even though his prime years were behind him by that time. I am not quite old enough to remember that fateful night in 1974 when Aaron broke Ruth's home run record, but when I watched Greatest Sports Legends or other vintage sports telecasts as a child I heard Milo Hamilton's famous call: "Here's the pitch by Downing. Swinging. There's a drive into left-center field. That ball is going to be out of here! IT'S GONE! IT'S 715! There's a new home run champion of all-time! And it's Henry Aaron!" That great moment was an early part of my introduction to sports, and an indelible memory.

It is also worth remembering what Vin Scully said at that time to place Aaron's accomplishment in historical perspective: "What a marvelous moment for baseball; what a marvelous moment for Atlanta and the state of Georgia; what a marvelous moment for the country and the world. A black man is getting a standing ovation in the Deep South for breaking a record of an all-time baseball idol. And it is a great moment for all of us, and particularly for Henry Aaron."

Hank Aaron lived the right way, played the right way, and he remains baseball's authentic home run king.

Lubomir Kavalek: Chess Champion, Author, Trainer, and Organizer

Grandmaster Lubomir Kavalek, one of the top 10 chess players in the world during the 1970s, has passed away at the age of 77. During his long and distinguished career he not only played at an elite level, but he also served as Bobby Fischer's unofficial second during the 1972 World Chess Championship, he trained many champions, he wrote hundreds of chess columns, and he organized tournaments.

Kavalek's chess career lasted for several decades. If you came of age as a chess player in the 1970s, then you remember Lubomir Kavalek as one of America's top players. If you came of age as a chess player in the 1980s, then you remember Lubomir Kavalek as a top trainer and organizer. If you came of age as a chess player in the 1990s or 2000s, then you remember Lubomir Kavalek as a chess writer who called a young Magnus Carlsen the "Mozart of Chess":

Kavalek left a deep imprint on chess history. Grandmaster Andy Soltis has said that if Kavalek had done nothing other than win his spectacular 1962 Student Olympiad game against Eduard Gufeld then Kavalek would still always be remembered. That game is remarkable--Kavalek's three passed pawns prevailed against Gufeld's Rook--but Kavalek was just 18 when he played that game, with a tremendous future in front of him.

Kavalek won the Czech national championship twice in the 1960s before defecting to the United States. After Fischer abandoned the tournament scene, Kavalek and Walter Browne emerged as America's top two players. Kavalek won two U.S. titles during the 1970s (and lost a playoff for a third title), while Browne won three U.S. titles during the 1970s (and three more during the 1980s). During that period, Kavalek and Browne battled--along with Robert Byrne and Larry Evans--to be the top ranked U.S. player on the FIDE (International Chess Federation) list, and on at least one occasion (January 1975) Browne and Kavalek were listed right next to each other, separated by just five rating points, behind Fischer (who was still listed even though he had not played since winning the World Championship in 1972) and Byrne. In January 1979, Kavalek ranked first and Browne second among U.S. players on the FIDE list. 

Kavalek organized the 1979 Montreal Tournament of the Stars, one of the strongest chess tournaments ever held. He also played in the event, starting off poorly with 1.5/9 but rallying to score 6.5/9 in the second half. Kavalek later said this was his best tournament performance. World Champion Anatoly Karpov and former World Champion Mikhail Tal shared first place.

Kavalek transitioned from being an active player to being a chess author, trainer, and organizer/promoter. He wrote a chess column for The Washington Post from 1995-2010, and then he wrote a chess column for The Huffington Post. Kavalek's chess writing sparkled with interesting analogies--in one column, he discussed similarities between the "baseline" styles of Bjorn Borg and Magnus Carlsen--in depth game analysis, and thoughtful musings about ways in which chess is both an art and a violent sport 

Kavalek understood that chess is much more than a game or a pastime. He declared, "Just to think about it as a game is degrading. It has certain elements of science and art and some competitive elements that have even to do with sport. It tests your imagination; it tests a lot of things. Sometimes it is not all pleasure. Sometimes you suffer."

Kavalek participated in nine Chess Olympiads--two while representing Czechoslovakia and seven while representing the United States--and he was a member of Team USA's gold medal winning 1976 squad. He was inducted in the U.S. Chess Hall of Fame in 2001.

Chiefs and Browns Demonstrate That Football Really is a Game of Inches

"The inches we need are everywhere around us."-- Coach Tony D'Amato in "Any Given Sunday"

It is often said that football is a game of inches, and the truth inherent in that cliche was vividly illustrated during a few key plays as the Super Bowl Champion Kansas City Chiefs defeated the Cleveland Browns 22-17 to advance to the AFC Championship Game for the third straight season.

The Browns were trying to maintain the momentum from last week's dominating road win in Pittsburgh, the franchise's first road playoff win since the NFL-AFL merger in 1970, but most analysts did not expect this matchup to be competitive. The Chiefs stormed to a 19-3 halftime lead, but the Browns were just inches away from trailing only 16-10 prior to intermission. 

Rashard Higgins led the Browns with 88 receiving yards on five catches (Jarvis Landry led the Browns with seven receptions, but he gained only 20 yards on those plays), and he had two catches for 48 yards on back to back plays near the end of the first half. After the second of those catches, Higgins dove for the right endzone pylon but he lost control of the ball, resulting in a touchback for the Chiefs. Kansas City's Daniel Sorensen delivered an illegal--but uncalled--helmet to helmet hit on Higgins that should have nullified the fumble and placed the Browns just inches away from tying the game with a touchdown and successful extra point. Instead, the Chiefs quickly drove for a field goal to extend their lead to 19-3. After the game, Cleveland Coach Kevin Stefanski praised Higgins' determination to score but also pointedly noted that he coaches his players to not extend the ball at the goal line precisely because of the high risk nature of such a play. CBS' Bill Cowher suggested that the NFL rule regarding an offensive player fumbling the ball into the endzone is overly punitive to the offensive team, and he suggested that the offense should receive the ball at the 20 yard line instead of the defense being granted a touchback. Cowher's colleague Boomer Esiason noted that it is a flaw in the NFL replay rules that Sorenson's dangerous and illegal helmet to helmet hit is not reviewable (replay review is only available for calls that are made, not missed calls).

The Browns proved their resiliency by fighting back in the second half and creating opportunities to win the game. The second half started disastrously as Baker Mayfield threw an interception deep in Cleveland territory, but the Browns held the Chiefs to an unsuccessful field goal attempt. The Browns then drove 77 yards in eight plays for a Landry touchdown reception. 

Former MVP and former Super Bowl MVP Patrick Mahomes left the game at the 7:27 mark of the third quarter with a possible concussion. He passed for 255 yards and one touchdown with no interceptions while completing 21 of 30 attempts. The Chiefs' drive stalled after journeyman Chad Henne replaced Mahomes, and they settled for a field goal--their final points of the game.

The Browns responded with an 18 play, 75 yard drive that lasted 8:17, included two fourth down conversions, and culminated in a three yard touchdown run by ex-Chief Kareem Hunt. The Chiefs led 22-17 with 11:07 remaining in the fourth quarter, and they had to navigate the closing moments without Mahomes, who could not return to action due to the NFL's concussion protocols.

On Kansas City's next possession, Henne threw an interception in the endzone, and the Browns started their drive at their 20 yard line with 8:00 left. The Browns converted a fourth and one to retain possession but, facing fourth and nine at their 32 with 4:19 left, they punted the ball, and they never ran another offensive play. Perhaps they were counting on being able to stop the Chiefs' Henne-led offense, but the Browns had already burned two timeouts and the best case realistic scenario after punting would have been along the lines of needing to drive 70 or 80 yards for a touchdown with about two minutes left and no timeouts. It would be interesting to know the odds of accomplishing that feat compared to the odds of converting fourth down and nine yards to go; I am sure that the odds are against both, but I suspect that the statistics would show that going for it on fourth down is a valid choice in that scenario. 

Henne led the Chiefs to a first down, forcing the Browns to use their final timeout. The Browns sacked Henne for a six yard loss on second and eight. On third and 14, Henne rushed for 13 yards, placing the Chiefs just inches away from a game-clinching first down. Now, the Chiefs faced the punt or go for it decision on fourth and one in their own territory. After the game, Chiefs Coach Andy Reid said that there was no doubt--at least on his sideline--that the Chiefs would go for it. Henne's short pass to Tyreek Hill netted five yards, and enabled the Chiefs to run out the clock. Henne finished 6-8 for 66 yards, no touchdowns, and one interception. Officially, he had two rushes for 12 yards, but the second carry was a game-ending kneeldown in victory formation. 

The heavily-favored Chiefs won by just five points, but what if Higgins had not fumbled out of the endzone or what if a targeting penalty had correctly been called against Kansas City on that play? What if the Browns had gone for it on fourth down late in the fourth quarter instead of punting the ball away? What if the Chiefs had not converted on fourth and one, giving the Browns the ball less than 50 yards away from being able to score the potentially winning touchdown? Of course, Chiefs fans may wonder what might have happened had Mahomes not been injured, but the game seemed to be heading toward a close finish either way, as the Browns proved during the second half that they could move the ball and score touchdowns. The teams combined to run 123 plays from scrimmage, and a few inches here or there on a handful of those plays could have changed the outcome. 

Losing close playoff games is nothing new to the Browns, whose fans have labeled many of those painful defeats with memorable names: Red Right 88, The Drive, The Fumble. The Browns' previous playoff loss, to Pittsburgh in 2003, came after Dennis Northcutt dropped a third down pass when a first down would have enabled the Browns to run out the clock on their division rivals. The Browns, after being pro football's dominant team in the 1940s (four AAFC titles in four seasons) and early 1950s (three titles and six straight championship game appearances to open the decade), have created an unfortunate organizational identity of being a team that consistently fails to find the inches that are everywhere around them. Browns fans can only hope that the 2020 season is the start of a new trend that will result in at least one Super Bowl win, as opposed to a continuation of decades of heartbreak.

The Chiefs are just the second NFL team to host three straight conference championship games. The first team to accomplish this was the Philadelphia Eagles, who hosted three consecutive NFC Championship Games from 2002-04 under the direction of Andy Reid. Reid's Eagles lost two of those NFC Championship Games, and they lost in the Super Bowl after winning the 2004 NFC Championship Game. Prior to arriving in Kansas City, Reid had a long history of losing in championship games, posting an 0-1 Super Bowl record and a 1-4 NFC Championship Game record, but he won his first AFC title and first Super Bowl last year, and he is now two victories away from becoming just the seventh coach to win back to back Super Bowls.

Browns Shock Steelers, Post First Road Playoff Win Since 1969

Due to COVID-19 protocols, the Cleveland Browns traveled to Pittsburgh without their head coach, their offensive line coach, and several players. Pittsburgh has been a house of horror for the Browns for the better part of the past 50 years, and there was little reason to believe that this would change during Sunday night's Wild Card playoff game--but the Browns' defense recovered a botched snap and scored on the first play from scrimmage en route to the Browns taking a 28-0 first quarter lead as the Browns tied the NFL playoff record for points in a first quarter. The Browns withstood Pittsburgh's second half rally to prevail 48-37. 

That is the third most points the Browns have scored in a playoff game, trailing only their 49-7 win over Buffalo in the 1948 All-America Football Conference (AAFC) Championship Game, and their 56-10 win over Detroit in the 1954 NFL Championship Game. 

Baker Mayfield earned a win in his first playoff start, completing 23 of 34 passes for 263 yards, three touchdowns, and no interceptions. Ben Roethlisberger set an NFL single-game record (including regular season and playoff games) with 47 completions (in 68 attempts, a playoff single-game record) and he amassed 501 passing yards (second most in playoff history, trailing only a 505 yard performance by Tom Brady in Super Bowl LII) plus four touchdowns but he also had four interceptions. Mayfield's passer rating was a sizzling 115.5, while Roethlisberger's was 85.5. The Steelers ran more offensive plays than the Browns (84-65) and gained more yards (553-390), but the Steelers also had five turnovers while the Browns had no turnovers.

The Browns' last playoff win was a victory over New England in January 1995. Bill Belichick coached in that game--but for the Browns, not for the Patriots! The Browns' last road playoff win came in Dallas in 1969. Since that game, the Browns had lost eight consecutive road playoff games, with the two most recent losses--"recent" being a relative term here, since those "recent" losses happened in 2003 and 1995--both inflicted by the Steelers.  

The last time the Browns posted a plus-.500 regular season record was 2007, when Cleveland briefly became "Believeland" in the wake of strong performances by the Cavaliers, Indians, and Browns, but the "Believeland" joy did not last long: LeBron James soon quit during the playoffs before fleeing Cleveland for Miami (though he later returned to Cleveland and led the Cavaliers to the 2016 NBA title), the Indians did not win another division title for nine years, and the clock struck midnight after the 2007 season as the Cinderella Browns resumed being the sad-sack Browns. 

Just four years ago, the Browns narrowly averted posting an 0-16 season before finishing 1-15--and then they went 0-16 in the next season, forever placing themselves on the short list of worst teams ever. The NFL is built to produce parity, and Bill Walsh explained many years ago that a properly run franchise can go from the basement to the penthouse in three years. Thus, it is inexcusable that the Browns were so terrible for so long, but it is a good sign that the current regime has built a strong playoff squad so soon after the Browns' winless season.

These are not the same old sorry Browns, contrary to JuJu Smith-Schuster's attempt to revive (more or less) what the 49ers once said about the "same old" Rams--of course, the 49ers had the good sense to wait to make that comment until after the outcome was certain to be in their favor, while Smith-Schuster opened his mouth prior to Sunday's playoff game to write a check that his team could not cash. 

The Browns will deservedly be heavy underdogs next week when they travel to Kansas City to battle the defending Super Bowl champions but--regardless of the outcome of that game--these Browns should be a playoff team for the next several years. Mayfield seems to have that hard to define but easy to see "it" factor; he not only has the physical tools to get the job done--including a powerful arm and excellent mobility--but he has emerged as a fiery and determined leader for this young team. In addition, this season the running back duo Nick Chubb and Kareem Hunt powered the Browns' most prolific rushing attack since the Leroy Kelly era, Jarvis Landry is the veteran leader of a very good receiving corps, Myles Garrett has emerged as an elite pass rusher, and the offensive line is not only talented but deep (as demonstrated in the Pittsburgh win after a combination of COVID-19 protocols plus in-game injuries decimated the unit to the point that Mayfield was playing behind at least one player who he had not even met until just before the game started!). "Believeland" was a mirage that briefly appeared during a two decade desert exile, but the Browns' victory over the Steelers is real, and there is good reason to believe that it is the start of something big for the team's long-suffering fans.

Nadal Dominates Djokovic to Win Record 13th French Open and Tie Federer With 20 Grand Slam Singles Titles

Move over Roger Federer: there is a new King of Grand Slam tennis. Rafael Nadal claimed his record 13th French Open singles title--and tied Federer for first on the all-time list with 20 Grand Slam singles titles--by defeating Novak Djokovic 6-0, 6-2, 7-5 in the French Open. Nadal is the first Open Era (i.e., post-1968) player to win four Grand Slam singles titles without losing a single set, breaking the record he shared with Bjorn Borg. Nadal is also the first Open era player to win six Grand Slam singles titles after the age of 30. For context, consider that Don Budge, Boris Becker, and Stefan Edberg each won six Grand Slam singles titles in their entire careers!

It has been fashionable for well over a decade to designate Federer as the greatest tennis player of all-time, even though Nadal owns a decisive 24-16 head to head advantage versus Federer, including 10-4 in Grand Slam matches. They have never met at the U.S. Open, but Nadal leads 6-0 at the French Open and 3-1 at the Australian Open, while Federer leads 3-1 at Wimbledon; it is important to note that Nadal beat Federer at Federer's best Grand Slam (Wimbledon) but Federer has never beaten Nadal at Nadal's best Grand Slam (French Open). Nadal has won 35 Masters 1000 titles compared to Federer's 28.

The only meaningful statistical advantage that Federer had over Nadal was total Grand Slam singles titles, though of course Federer enjoyed a head start since he is nearly five years older than Nadal. Now that Nadal has tied Federer--with a great opportunity to pass Federer--it is difficult to find a rational justification to rank Federer ahead of Nadal. Federer's fans would argue that head to head does not matter or that the head to head comparison is somehow unfair because so many of the matches were played on clay, which is Nadal's best surface. Head to head does not matter if one player has the clearly superior overall resume, or if the head to head sample size is small, or if the head to head sample size pits one player in his prime versus another player who either had not reached his prime or was clearly past his prime. Here, Nadal's overall resume is certainly not worse than Federer's, the head to head sample size is large, and--if anything--in the early going it could be said that Federer was in his prime while Nadal was still improving. In any case, Nadal built a head to head advantage early on in the matchup, and has maintained it ever since.  

Federer is nearly five years older than Nadal and the record shows that Nadal consistently accomplished more at a younger age than Federer did. For example, by age 21 Nadal had won three Grand Slam singles titles while Federer had not won any by age 21. Nadal won his 20th Grand Slam singles title at age 34; Federer had won 17 Grand Slam singles titles at age 34. Federer has been remarkably durable, and his fans speculated (hoped?) that Nadal's body would break down but Nadal has persevered to remain a dominant player in his mid-30s.

Nadal has a better career Grand Slam winning percentage than Federer, winning in 20 of his 60 appearances (.333) compared to 20/79 (.253) for Federer. 

What about Djokovic? He has a slight head to head advantage over Nadal (29-27), but Djokovic has won three fewer Grand Slam singles titles despite being just one year younger than Nadal. Djokovic's Grand Slam winning percentage (17/62; .274) is better than Federer's but worse than Nadal's. Djokovic has a head to head lead over Federer (27-23, including 11-6 in Grand Slam matches). 

It makes no sense to crown Federer as the greatest of all-time when he is not even clearly the greatest of his era. Taking everything into account (totals, winning percentages, head to head), Nadal has the best resume of this era, but it is possible that Djokovic could still pass both Federer and Nadal. 

The player who unfortunately is too often left out of this conversation is Bjorn Borg. If you are too young to remember Borg then the best way to explain him is that during his era he was Federer and Nadal combined. Borg dominated Wimbledon with five straight titles (1976-80), setting the modern record later broken by Pete Sampras (and then surpassed by Federer)--and at the same time Borg dominated the French Open with six titles in eight years (1974-75, 1978-81), setting the modern record later broken by Nadal. Borg is remembered for having a relatively brief career, but he had a long run at the top: his record of winning at least one Grand Slam singles title for eight straight years (1974-81) stood for 19 years until Sampras matched it. Federer equaled this mark in 2010, and then Nadal broke it by winning at least one Grand Slam title for 10 straight years (2005-2014).

Nearly 40 years after he retired (not counting his brief comeback), Borg still holds many records, including some feats that may never be matched: 

1) Best Grand Slam tournament winning percentage (.407; 11/27)

2) Best Open Era Grand Slam singles match winning percentage (.898; 141-16).

3) Best overall winning percentage against Top 10 players (.725)

4) Four consecutive years with overall match winning percentage above .900 (1977-80) 

5) 10 consecutive titles won

By virtue of their longevity, Nadal, Federer, and Djokovic have amassed larger totals than Borg, but ranking tennis players purely by totals would be like ranking NFL running backs purely by yards and then calling Emmitt Smith the greatest running back of all-time. Borg was the best player of his era on both clay and grass, a simultaneous dominance that may never be matched again. Borg did not have a contemporary who dominated him the way that Nadal dominates Federer. 

There is no way to prove this unless someone invents a time machine, but I would submit that from a standpoint of skill set, physical conditioning, and mental toughness, Federer at his Wimbledon best would not beat Borg at his Wimbledon best (assuming that both players are provided identical equipment). We don't even have to talk about Borg versus Federer at the French Open. 

Borg versus Nadal at the French Open might be the most intriguing hypothetical one on one matchup in any sport. Nadal has played longer than Borg did and thus dominated for a longer time, but what would happen if Borg at his French Open best played Nadal at his French Open best? That is a tough call. However, Borg at his Wimbledon best would beat Nadal at his Wimbledon best.

In the absence of those time machine matches, all we can say for sure is that (1) Nadal is nudging aside Federer for the distinction of most accomplished Open Era career, with Djokovic potentially waiting in the wings, and (2) some of Borg's winning percentage records may never be touched.

Related Articles: 

Another Perspective on Borg/Nadal/Federer (February 7, 2009) 

Sports Illustrated Figures Out That It Was Premature to Crown Federer (May 14, 2009)

How Can Federer be the Greatest Player of All-Time if He is Not Even the Greatest Player of His Time? (June 19, 2011)

Federer and Nadal as Non-Religious Experience (March 27, 2012)

MLB Strikes Out, as Usual

Buster Olney's article How shortsighted greed is tearing baseball apart provides a great summary of some of the reasons that MLB is falling apart. It is worth emphasizing that he sees a direct connection between the flawed tanking mentality that has also harmed the NBA and the current mindset that is damaging MLB:

It's the Luhnow mindset as applied to labor relations.

Under Luhnow, the Houston Astros were the sport's supreme practitioners of tanking, becoming the first team since the 1962-65 Mets to lose at least 106 games in three consecutive seasons. In Luhnow's first three seasons as Houston GM, the Astros spent a total of $137.4 million in payroll--$53 million less than the next-lowest team, the Pirates ($190.7 million). The Astros drew a 0.0 in local television ratings for consecutive seasons. They manipulated the service time of some of their best young players, as did other teams. Luhnow's team engaged in ultra, next-level sign-stealing, and traded for Roberto Osuna fresh off his 75-game suspension under the sport's domestic violence policy.

But so long as the math made sense, Luhnow pushed the envelope and the Astros won a World Series in 2017. Of course, in the big picture, Luhnow's management turned out to be a disaster for many reasons besides wins and losses. Under his watch, the Astros helped to drag the sport under a low bar of credibility as other teams tried to replicate his formula, with fans left to wonder if what they paid to see was farcical.

Throughout those years, which included Luhnow giving the OK for a club employee to monitor the opposing dugout from an adjacent camera well, you kept waiting for someone to step up and lead. You kept waiting for someone to acknowledge the astounding accumulation of damage to good-faith competition and operation, just as you keep on waiting for someone on the owners' side to end this embarrassing negotiation with the players' association, rather than engaging in this battle of reconstituted Spam offers.

The house of baseball is burning and somebody needs to put out the fire immediately, by making a deal that moves the sport forward beyond this absurd fight over increments.

The opportunity to own the sporting stage in early July is gone. The potential goodwill (and ratings) all but certain for the first big sport out of the gate may be all but squandered.

Chicago Cubs owner Tom Ricketts talking about a cash-flow problem when tens of millions of people have lost their jobs? Not good. Cardinals owner Bill DeWitt, who has seen the value of his franchise multiply by at least a factor of 10, talking about how you can't make money in baseball? Not good.

If COVID-19 had not prevented the 2020 MLB season from starting on time, the focus would have been on MLB's weak, incompetent, and impotent response to widespread cheating. Now, the focus on that fiasco may have faded a bit, but only because MLB seems determined to commit suicide.

MLB has been a disaster for over 25 years; the best thing that the sport did in that time period, paradoxically, is to have a strike that ended Michael Jordan's baseball career; this hastened his NBA comeback, during which he won three more NBA titles, culminating in the "Last Dance" season. The strike was terrible for baseball, but I would gladly give up the World Series in exchange for watching Michael Jordan play in the NBA again.

Bud Selig was a horrible Commissioner who presided over the destruction of MLB's once-cherished record book; it is a travesty and an embarrassment that he is in the Baseball Hall of Fame at all, let alone that he was welcomed while Pete Rose remains banned. Rob Manfred, Selig's successor, may turn out to be even more horrible than Selig was--as bad as Selig was, MLB did not die on his watch; if Manfred and crew do not get their act together, MLB may lose the entire 2020 season, and suffer permanent damage.

Don Shula's Legacy of Winning With Integrity

Don Shula, the NFL's all-time leader in regular season coaching wins (328) and combined regular season/playoff wins (347), passed away on May 4 at the age of 90. Shula is best known for leading the 1972 Miami Dolphins to a 17-0 record and the Super Bowl title, the only perfect season in NFL history (three other teams--the 1934 Chicago Bears, the 1942 Chicago Bears, and the 2007 New England Patriots--enjoyed undefeated regular seasons but did not win the NFL Championship or Super Bowl). The Dolphins repeated as Super Bowl champions in 1973, posting a 15-2 overall record. From 1971-73, the Dolphins went 44-6-1 overall with three straight Super Bowl appearances and two Super Bowl titles.

Before he became a coach, Shula had 21 interceptions while playing for three teams during his seven season (1951-57) NFL career. Shula spent two seasons as a college assistant coach before becoming an assistant coach for the Detroit Lions in 1960. He then served two seasons as the Lions' defensive coordinator (1961-62) before becoming the Baltimore Colts' head coach in 1963. At that time, Shula was the youngest head coach in NFL history. The Colts went 7-7 in 1962 (the season before Shula arrived), and by 1964 they were a 12-2 team that advanced to the NFL Championship Game before losing 27-0 to the Cleveland Browns. 

During his 33 year NFL head coaching career, Shula made 19 playoff appearances, won 16 division titles (including four straight from 1971-74, and five straight from 1981-85), won five AFC titles (1971-73, 1982, 1984), led Baltimore to the 1968 NFL title (the Colts lost Super Bowl III to the AFL champion New York Jets), and posted a 2-4 record in the Super Bowl. Only Bill Belichick (nine) has been a head coach in more Super Bowls than Shula. Shula is one of 13 coaches who have won at least two Super Bowl titles, and only Belichick (six), Chuck Noll (four), Bill Walsh (three), and Joe Gibbs (three) have won more Super Bowls than Shula. Shula is the only four-time winner (1964, 1967, 1968, 1972) of the AP NFL Coach of the Year award, an honor that has been presented since 1957. Only four NFL coaches amassed at least 250 regular season wins: Shula, George Halas (318), Bill Belichick (273), and Tom Landry (250).

Shula long ago established his position in the NFL coaching pantheon, but during the first portion of his coaching career he battled the stigma that he could not win the big game. He did not win a playoff game until his sixth season in Baltimore, when he took the Colts to the 1968 NFL title, but much of the luster of that accomplishment was wiped away by the Colts' loss to the Jets in Super Bowl III. Shula lasted just one more season in Baltimore before moving to Miami to coach the Dolphins, a 1966 AFL expansion team entering its first season as an NFL team. The Dolphins had not won more than five games in a season prior to Shula's arrival, but they went 10-4 in his first season, dominated the league for the next three seasons, and only posted two losing records during Shula's 1970-95 tenure with the franchise. By the time he retired, Shula--much like former UCLA coach John Wooden--had conclusively overcome the stigma/perception/narrative that he could not win the big game.

Former NFL coach Bum Phillips once said of Shula, "Don Shula can take his'n and beat you'n, and he could take you'n and beat his'n." Shula's record speaks for itself, but Shula was most proud of how he compiled that record: "If I'm remembered for anything, I hope it's for playing within the rules. I also hope it will be said that my teams showed class and dignity in victory or defeat."

In addition to integrity and sustained excellence, Shula's coaching career is also distinguished by the adaptability that he displayed. His early Dolphin teams were characterized by a tremendous running attack plus a stout defense, but in the 1980s Shula opened up his offense to take full advantage of Dan Marino's passing ability. The Dolphins advanced to one Super Bowl with Marino, and they were a perennial playoff team during the early to mid 1980s before having a few subpar seasons in the second half of that decade. Shula led the Dolphins to four playoff appearances in the first six years of the 1990s--including a trip to the AFC Championship Game after the 1992 season--before he retired.

Shula left big footprints to fill. The Dolphins have made just two playoff appearances since 2001, and they have not advanced to the AFC Championship Game since the 1992 season. Hall of Fame Coach Jimmy Johnson inherited a 9-7 team from Shula, and went 8-8, 9-7, 10-6, and 9-7 in his four seasons with the Dolphins.

Refuting False Narratives About the Legacies of Tom Brady and Bill Belichick

Tom Brady has publicly announced that he plans to leave the New England Patriots via free agency, though he has yet to announce where he is going. Not surprisingly, Brady's statement has unleashed a wave of commentary about his legacy, and Bill Belichick's legacy, as well as a reexamination of previous all-time greats who could have played their entire careers for one team but elected to see if the grass was greener elsewhere--with Joe Montana, Michael Jordan, and Peyton Manning being perhaps the three most prominent examples.

Both Belichick and Brady have more than secured their individual legacies. Belichick was a key contributor to two Super Bowl champions as an assistant coach before winning six Super Bowls as New England's head coach. Any short list of the greatest football coaches of all-time must include his name, and nothing that happens in the rest of his career will change or diminish that. Belichick is the second oldest head coach in the NFL now, and he is tied with several others as the eighth oldest head coach in NFL history. A career is judged by the overall body of work, with an emphasis on what happened in the prime years; Belichick's career is not going to be defined by what happens in his final seasons. Of course, if he wins Super Bowls as an elder statesman coach that could potentially add to his already established legacy, but no sensible person is going to hold it against Belichick if he does not win another Super Bowl. Don Shula, Chuck Noll, and Tom Landry are three of the greatest coaches of all-time, and their careers ended long after their final Super Bowl victory with no damage done to their legacies.

Brady is a six-time Super Bowl champion quarterback who is nearing the end of his career. If he wins another Super Bowl, he can add to his legacy, but few quarterbacks have even played as long as Brady, let alone won championships at his age; if Brady does not win another Super Bowl, it does not hurt his legacy any more than Joe Montana's time as a Kansas City Chief did.

Speaking of which, without looking it up do you even remember how long Montana played in Kansas City, what statistics he posted, and how the team performed? Unless you are an NFL addict with a great memory or you are lying, the honest answer is "No."

Before revisiting the end of Montana's career, it is worth briefly mentioning Joe Namath, whose name is sometimes brought up in this context. While it may have been painful at the time for NFL fans to watch him finish his career as an L.A. Ram, Namath secured his legacy by leading the New York Jets to victory in Super Bowl III. Nothing that happened after that caused long-term damage to Namath's legacy. He will always be remembered as a triumphant Jet, and no one spends much time thinking about his brief time as a stumbling Ram.

Back to Montana, who spent two years as a Chief, making the Pro Bowl in 1993 (his first season with the team) and compiling a 17-8 regular season record (he missed seven games due to injury) in 1993-94. Montana led the Chiefs to the 1993 AFC Championship Game, but the Chiefs lost 30-13, and Montana was knocked out of the game with a concussion in the third quarter. Montana quarterbacked the Chiefs to a 9-7 record and a loss in the Wild Card round in 1994 before he retired at 38. Those two seasons are a solid postscript to a Hall of Fame career, but they had no impact on the legacy that Montana had already forged by winning four Super Bowls as a San Francisco 49er.

Consider an example from a different sport. Michael Jordan had already retired and come back once as a Chicago Bull before he came out of retirement in 2001 to play for the Washington Wizards. Jordan never averaged less than 28 ppg in a full season with the Bulls, and he never averaged more than 23 ppg in his two seasons with the Wizards. Jordan led the Bulls to six titles in six NBA Finals appearances, and he was not able to take the Wizards to the playoffs even once. No, Jordan the Wizard did not accomplish as much as Jordan the Bull, but Jordan the Wizard added some clips to his career highlight reel, and did not harm Jordan's legacy at all.

Brady and Manning spent much of their careers battling for individual honors and Super Bowl titles. Manning won one Super Bowl in 13 seasons as a Colt before finishing his career as a Denver Bronco. Manning earned three Pro Bowl selections as a Bronco while also making the All-Pro First Team twice, and winning another Super Bowl title. Interestingly, his two playoff runs that ended in Super Bowl wins are two of his four worst postseasons statistically (based on the NFL's passer rating system). Winning a second Super Bowl--albeit while no longer a star player (he had nine passing touchdowns and 17 interceptions in his final regular season before the Broncos won the Super Bowl)--perhaps added a bit to Manning's legacy, but certainly no one dwells on how limited a player Manning was by that time, nor would any rational commentator have held it against Manning if his Bronco years had not been capped off with a championship.

Supposedly, next season is going to represent some kind of referendum in a made up Belichick versus Brady competition: Can Brady win without Belichick? Can Belichick win without Brady? Will neither one win?

This is nonsense. If there were to be a genuine, meaningful Belichick versus Brady competition then we would need to pit them against each other when both were in their primes, and we would need to supply them with comparable supporting casts. Give prime Brady a different coach and a solid supporting cast, and how much would he win? How much Brady wins as a past his prime quarterback can only tell us so much.

The other side of the question is how much would prime Belichick win with a different quarterback and a solid supporting cast? 

Actually, we did get a glimpse of that during the 2008 season that Brady missed with an ACL injury, and we saw the Patriots go 11-5 with Matt Cassel as the starting quarterback. Cassel left the Patriots after that season, and went 26-40 as a starter during the rest of his career. During his first head coaching job, Belichick inherited a 3-13 Cleveland team and in four years he turned them into an 11-5 squad that won a playoff game (which is the last playoff game that the Browns have won). So, we do have some evidence about what Belichick can do as a coach without Brady.

All that we know for sure is that the Belichick-Brady tandem is the greatest coach-quarterback duo in NFL history (throw in the AAFC years, and you could make an argument for Paul Brown-Otto Graham, who won seven championships and made 10 championship game appearances in 10 seasons together). Whether or not either of them win any more Super Bowls in the final years of their respective careers does not change the significance of what they accomplished together, nor "prove" that one was more integral to their shared success than the other.

UEFA's Strong Response to Cheating Emphasizes MLB's Incompetence

The public recently learned The Disgraceful Secret of the Astros' and Red Sox' Success: Cheating, and we also saw Major League Baseball (MLB) Commissioner Rob Manfred set the price that an MLB owner must be willing to pay for cheating to win a World Series title: $5 million. Manfred made it clear that if a team cheats to win the World Series then that team keeps the title and "the piece of metal" (as he dismissively referred to the trophy awarded to his sport's champion). How many MLB owners would pay $5 million to win a World Series title?

Fortunately, not every sport responds so casually to cheating. In Foul Balls and Red Cards: How Baseball and Soccer’s Different Approaches to Cheating Illustrate the Power of Organizational Response, authors Reid Whitten and J. Scott Maberry (both from the law firm SheppardMullin) contrast the punishment that MLB prescribed for the Houston Astros with how UEFA (the governing body of European soccer) dealt with cheating committed by Manchester City, one of the English Premier League's top teams (footnotes omitted):

In both cases, the team's cheating threatened the integrity of the whole sport. In both cases, the integrity of the sport is critical to the business model of the respective leagues. If fans begin to think one side has been allowed an unfair advantage, they will quickly lose faith in the competitive nature of the sport. Fans would then, slowly but surely, lose interest in spending money to support their teams.

For those reasons, in both cases, the governing leagues needed to respond quickly and decisively to reassure fans that the games are fair and to restore the integrity of their respective organizations. Where soccer succeeded in doing so, baseball has failed.

The highest prize in European soccer is the UEFA Champions League trophy. The Champions League is a season-long competition where the best club teams from countries from Ireland to Russia, from Poland to Portugal play in an international tournament of the champions of the various national systems (Manchester City, for example, is one of the most dominant teams in the English Premier League). It is an honor just to make the Champions League tournament and, when a team wins that tournament, it stakes its claim as the best team in Europe.

Among other violations, the UEFA's investigation of Manchester City found that the team's owner, a billionaire from the United Arab Emirates, funneled his own money to companies who had signed sponsorship agreements with the team, which enabled the team owner to evade limits on spending his own money on the team. The punishment, announced in February, is a two-year ban from playing in the Champions League. No trophies, no mid-week competitions on the world's biggest stage for soccer clubs, no ticket sales, television rights, or website clicks for updates. Done. Two years. You cheated, you're out of the Big Dance...

We predict that the UEFA's approach will help lead to a healing of Manchester City's wounds to European soccer, whereas MLB's response has merely magnified the Astros' threat to baseball.

In MLB's missed opportunity is a lesson for all organizations: sometimes it feels too harsh to punish wrongdoers inside an organization. But when the organization's very integrity is threatened by the cheating, the cheaters have to be dealt with.

When the walls of your house have rotten boards, you need to find the rot and cut it away, not paint it over. Cutting out the rot is difficult and sometimes painful. But it may be just the thing that keeps your house standing.

MLB has been a bad joke for more than a quarter century, dating back at least to the 1994 strike that wiped out the sport's crown jewel event, the World Series. We have also witnessed fake home run records (and, in some cases, inflated pitching statistics) created by PED cheaters, and the 2002 MLB All-Star Game ending in a tie as clueless Commissioner Bud Selig shrugged his shoulders impotently on national TV. MLB's simultaneous embrace of Alex Rodriguez--who should have received a lifetime ban--and ostracism of Pete Rose (even as MLB makes millions of dollars now by partnering with legalized betting operations) is bizarre, though not quite as bizarre as the fact that Selg is in the Baseball Hall of Fame but Rose is not.

What Mariano Rivera Taught Walter Iooss Jr. About Gratitude and Humility

The December 12, 2011 issue of Sports Illustrated included an article by Walter Iooss Jr. and Chris Ballard titled "The Education of Walter Iooss Jr." Iooss' stories about athletes he photographed ranging from Jim Brown to Muhammad Ali to Michael Jordan to Tiger Woods--and many more--provide fascinating insights not only about those athletes, but also about Iooss and the art of photography.

What stopped me in my tracks, though, and inspired this brief article, is an exchange that Iooss had with Mariano Rivera, the New York Yankees' great closer. The conversation began when Iooss asked Rivera how he learned the pitch that brought him so many victories, the cut fastball (or cutter):

Then one time I asked him, "Who taught you that cutter?"

He said, "God."

I said, "God did?" Being an atheist, I said, "God never taught me anything."

Mariano said, "Oh, yes, he did, Walter."

He was very calm. He said, "He gave you your great talent. You should be thankful."

That humbled me. The truth is, I see photos everywhere. I look at someone sitting next to me at lunch, and instantly I'm putting up a background in my mind. That's just churning all the time. If the beauty's there, I want to take a picture of it.

Rivera's gratitude and humility are qualities well worth emulating. Iooss' drive to use his gift to capture beautiful images and share them with others is likewise inspirational.

Dr. Jonathan Gelber Examines The Intersection of Law and Medicine in Sports

Dr. Jonathan Gelber's book Tiger Woods's Back and Tommy John's Elbow: Injuries & Tragedies That Transformed Careers, Sports, and Society packs a lot of interesting information into less than 200 pages. Dr. Gelber begins with the legend of the "Cobra Effect," which is an example of the sociological concept of unintended consequences: as the story goes, an Indian Raj sought to curb the presence of cobras in his territory by offering a bounty for dead cobra skins--but the unintended consequence was that his citizens bred cobras in order to kill them for the bounty, and then after the Raj canceled the bounty the breeders set these cobras loose in the countryside since there was no longer any value for killing the cobras.

There are many examples of the "Cobra Effect" in Dr. Gelber's book, and here is one to whet your appetite to read about the rest of them.

It is well known that L.A. Dodgers' pitcher Sandy Koufax retired in 1966 at age 30 to prevent permanent damage to his left (pitching) elbow. Dr. Robert Kerlan, the Dodgers' team doctor, diagnosed Koufax with arthritis, the result of years of trauma to Koufax' elbow. A few years after Koufax retired, Dr. Kerlan partnered with Dr. Frank Jobe to form the Kerlan-Jobe Clinic, which later became world-famous for treating athletes from a variety of sports.

In 1974, Tommy John--then a pitcher for the Chicago White Sox--suffered an elbow destabilization injury that Dr. Gelber suggests was similar to the one that had eventually forced Koufax to retire. Dr. Jobe, consulting with hand surgeon Dr. Herbert Stark, decided to perform a radical new surgery, taking a tendon from John's forearm and carefully threading it through John's elbow to stabilize the joint. John went on to win more games after undergoing the procedure than he had won before, and the operation is now known as Tommy John surgery.

The "Cobra Effect" here is that Tommy John surgery has gone from being a radical solution to an injury that threatened to end a pitcher's career to a procedure that has become commonplace among young pitchers, many of whom undergo the surgery not to cure injury but based on the false belief that the surgery inherently increases performance levels. As a result of this, Tommy John has publicly stated his opposition to how prevalent his namesake surgery has become among young athletes, noting that over half of such surgeries are performed on patients who are between 15-19 years old, and that one in seven of those kids will never fully recover.

Other "Cobra Effect" stories examined by Dr. Gelber include Magic Johnson and HIV, Lyle Alzado and steroids, Len Bias and drug abuse/mandatory minimum sentencing, Hank Gathers and athlete screening for underlying health issues, Ayrton Senna/Dale Earnhardt and race car safety issues, Duk-koo Kim and efforts to make boxing safer, Tom Brady and measures to protect the quarterback from injury, plus Tiger Woods' back injury and the use/abuse of opioid drugs. 

This book is thought-provoking, and I recommend it with just two caveats: (1) The existence of a "Cobra Effect" is suggested but not conclusively proven in some of the examples and (2) the book would be even better if it had been lengthier so that some of the issues raised could be discussed in more depth.

The Disgraceful Secret of the Astros' and Red Sox' Success: Cheating

The Houston Astros have been widely portrayed as a model franchise in terms of utilizing analytics to build a successful team: the Astros tanked to accumulate draft picks, and then they used analytics to decide which players to draft, which veteran players to acquire, and how to maximize the talents of those players during games.

All of that sounds great in theory--but the reality is that the secret edge that pushed the Astros over the top and enabled them to win the 2017 World Series was old fashioned cheating: the Astros stole the opposing team's signs during games and then made noise in their dugout to alert their hitters about which pitch to expect.

If Bud Selig were still the Major League Baseball Commissioner, the Astros would have probably received a slap on the wrist while Selig broke his arm patting himself on the back, which was baseball's version of crime and punisment as Selig presided over the "Steroids Era." Fortunately, Rob Manfred at least has some sense of how serious this offense is: Commissioner Manfred assessed a $5 million fine against the Astros, stripped the franchise of its first and second round picks in both 2020 and 2021, and suspended General Manager Jeff Luhnow and Manager A.J. Hinch for the 2020 season (the Astros subsequently fired both men, neither of whom will be permitted to work for any other MLB team next season). Many baseball insiders have publicly expressed surprise at these supposedly draconian punishments but Manfred--although he showed more sense than Selig, an admittedly low hurdle to clear--did not go far enough. The Astros still go down in history as the 2017 World Series champions, and not one player who participated in the cheating has received any punishment.

It is becoming increasingly hard to understand why Pete Rose is burdened with a lifetime ban, while cheating players such as Barry Bonds, Mark McGwire and Alex Rodriguez are embraced by Major League Baseball, and cheating teams like Houston and Boston (see below) retain their coveted (but forever tarnished) World Series crowns.

MLB has a lot to learn from other sports. In track and field, cheaters like Ben Johnson, Marion Jones and others are stripped of their Olympic and World Championship medals. In cycling, Lance Armstrong's seven Tour de France titles were voided.

If MLB and its leadership had any courage or any sense, Barry Bonds, Mark McGwire, Alex Rodriguez and every other "Steroids Era" cheater would be removed from the record book and banned from Hall of Fame consideration--and the Astros would be stripped of the 2017 World Series title, with every player who was involved in the cheating being disciplined by MLB. Manfred's excuses for not punishing the players--too many players were involved, many of the players play for other teams now, and he did not feel like he could determine the relative guilt of each player--are weak, and provide an open invitation to players to cheat in the future, with the knowledge that if they are caught then they will keep their World Series rings while their manager and GM take the fall.

The investigation into the Astros' wrongdoing revealed that Alex Cora--who played a major role in Houston's cheating as a bench coach--similarly participated in cheating perpetrated by the Boston Red Sox as he served as that team's manager during their 2018 World Series championship season. Cora should be banned for life, and the Red Sox should be stripped of their title--but it is possible that Cora will get off with no more than a one year suspension, and it is likely that the Red Sox will pay a price that does not include losing their championship.

Of course, Boston is another franchise that has been lauded for profitably utilizing analytics.

Analytics have proven their value in many fields, from science to retail to law; law is my profession, and as a Customer Success Manager for Lex Machina--the pioneer and leader in the legal analytics field--I am well aware of the tremendous value provided by analytics that are accurate, complete and relevant. However, this MLB cheating scandal renews the question of just how valuable or reliable baseball analytics are; if the analytics provide a decisive edge, then why would two teams that are deeply immersed in analytics risk getting caught stealing signs?

I have often written about the strengths and limitations of "advanced basketball statistics" and the application of real basketball analytics, but the widely held assumption for quite some time is that analytics work better in baseball than in basketball because baseball is a station to station game of discrete actions, not a free-flowing game of interconnected simultaneous actions.

The Houston and Boston cheating scandals do not "prove" that baseball analytics have no value, but these scandals do legitimately raise the question of how much of an advantage Houston and Boston gained through analytics compared to how much of an advantage they gained by breaking the rules.

Why do I criticize the Astros and Red Sox after previously expressing the opinion that the so-called "Spygate" and "Deflategate" situations involving the New England Patriots were overblown by the media? Simple. The Astros and Red Sox unambiguously and deliberately cheated, and their cheating led directly to the championships that they won. In contrast, the Patriots committed a technical rules violation in "Spygate" that may not have even conferred a significant competitive advantage, and it is not even clear that they did anything wrong in "Deflategate." While baseball pitch signals are concealed, the signals that the Patriots filmed during "Spygate" can be viewed by anyone watching an NFL game on TV; the systematic gathering and collection of those signals for later analysis is not permitted (and that is why the Patriots were punished by the NFL), but this is not the same as intercepting a catcher's signals in real time and banging a trash can in the dugout to let the batter know in real time the exact pitch that is coming. Further, the Astros and Red Sox attempted to conceal what they were doing, while the Patriots' videographers were wearing team colors, and their presence could not have been more obvious if they had been waving semaphore flags. Regarding "Deflategate," independent scientists examined the evidence and concluded that the methodology and conclusions of the infamous Wells Report were flawed.

NFL cheating incidents that should outrage fans include (1) the 2010 Saints putting "bounties" on opposing players en route to winning the Super Bowl, (2) the Denver Broncos circumventing salary cap rules to stack enough talent around John Elway to enable him to win two Super Bowls in the 1990s, (3) the San Francisco 49ers circumventing salary cap rules during the 1990s, and (4) the massive steroid use that fueled the Pittsburgh Steelers' 1970s championship teams (and may be responsible for the sad, early demises suffered by many of the players from those teams).

Of course, the media picks and chooses who to target and who to absolve in these situations. New England Coach Bill Belichick rarely provides useful soundbites to the media, so it is OK for the media to dub him "Belicheat." The Saints were a fairy tale story in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, so their intentional maiming of opposing NFL players is readily forgotten; Gregg Williams, the ringleader of the Saints' bounty scheme, is back in the NFL and is a respected coach, even though some players say that he is still coaching his players to intentionally injure opposing players. Elway's Broncos, and the 1990s 49ers are also popular, so their transgressions are forgotten. The Steelers are part of the NFL's ancient and storied history, so no one cares to examine their widespread steroid abuse.

It will be interesting to see how the media choose to depict the Astros and the Red Sox. For me as a baseball fan, Major League Baseball has not been the same since the strike canceled the 1994 World Series, and then the "Steroids Era" combined with Bud Selig's bumbling (remember the 2002 All-Star Game that ended in a tie while Selig shrugged?) permanently stained the sport and its once-hallowed record book--though, as a basketball fan, I thank MLB for having a strike that lasted so long that it helped push Michael Jordan back to the NBA. This latest scandal just confirms to me that the baseball record book before 1994 was nonfiction, while the baseball record book post-1994 is fiction, replete with fraudulent home runs, fraudulent MVPs and, now, fraudulent champions. This is not to say that other pro sports are pure or flawless, but the past 25 years or so have been brutal for MLB.